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PRISONERS AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: BRIDGES 
TO A NEW FUTURE IN PRISONERS’ FREE SPEECH 
RETALIATION CLAIMS  
 
MATTHEW D. ROSE* 
Cite as: Matthew D. Rose, Comment, Prisoners and Public Employees: Bridges to a 
New Future in Prisoners’ Free Speech Retaliation Claims, 5 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 
159 (2009), http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v5-1/rose.pdf. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Prisoners, by virtue of their incarceration, necessarily sacrificed 
some of the constitutional rights and privileges that they possessed as 
free citizens to ensure the effective operation of our prison system.1 In 
the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court case of Pell v. 
Procunier established that “a prison inmate retains those First 
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner 
or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system” 
(the “Pell test”).2 Yet, the Court left this “superficial formula” relatively 
unexamined and undefined.3 Specifically, Pell refrained from 
determining if the First Amendment right to free speech remained 
“inconsistent with a prison inmate’s status as a prisoner or with the 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Jan. 2007, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. Thank you, 
Mallory, for your enduring love and support. 
1 See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), abrogated by 
McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (“[L]awful incarceration brings about the 
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction 
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.”). 
2 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).     
3 See MICHAEL B. MUSLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1.04 (2d ed. 1993) (“This 
superficial formula fails to identify which constitutional rights are taken by law, but 
it does make the point that important rights survive incarceration.”). 
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legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”4 Instead, 
Pell and its progeny primarily evaluated whether prison restrictions on 
prisoners’ asserted free speech rights possessed a reasonable relation 
to the government’s legitimate penological interests.5  
Eventually, Turner v. Safley expressly confirmed the Court’s 
approach to evaluating the reasonableness of prison restrictions on 
prisoners’ asserted free speech rights.6 Turner announced that “when a 
prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the 
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests” (the “Turner test”).7 Turner further established a very 
deferential rational basis standard of review and a relatively well-
defined four-factor approach to evaluate the relationship between the 
prison’s restrictions and its legitimate penological interests.8 Turner, 
however, neglected to precisely identify the existence and scope of 
protection to prisoners’ free speech rights.9    
Consequently, the Court’s neglect of the Pell test and the overall 
uncertain status of prisoners’ free speech rights presented considerable 
difficulties for the Seventh Circuit when it evaluated prisoners’ free 
speech retaliation claims.10 Because the Court never determined if the 
First Amendment protected prisoners’ free speech from retaliation or 
the proper constitutional standard for evaluating prisoners’ free speech 
retaliation claims,11 the Seventh Circuit found itself applying the 
Court’s well-known and well-defined test for evaluating public 
employees’ free speech retaliation claims to the prison setting.12  
                                                 
4 See discussion infra Part I.A and note 52 and accompanying text. 
5 See discussion infra Part I.A and note 61 and accompanying text. 
6 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see discussion infra Part I.B. 
7 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
8 See id. at 89–93; discussion infra Parts I.B.  
9 See discussion infra Parts I.B–C.  
10 See discussion infra Part IV.A., IV.C, V.B.  
11 See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2009) (observing that the 
Court’s prisoner free speech jurisprudence refrained from explicitly mandating, or 
excluding, the legitimate penological interests test for evaluating prisoners’ free 
speech retaliation claims). 
12 See, e.g., Brookins v. Kolb, 990 F.2d 308, 313(7th Cir. 1992), abrogated in 
part by Bridges, 557 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 
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In the Court’s public employee free speech jurisprudence, the 
First Amendment protected a public employee’s speech against 
retaliation only if the public employee (1) “spoke as a citizen on a 
matter of public concern” (the “public concern test”);13 and (2) the 
government-employer possessed no “adequate justification for treating 
the employee differently from any other member of the general 
public” (the “Pickering balancing test”).14 Hence, the Seventh Circuit 
supported the notion that the First Amendment protected a prisoner’s 
speech against retaliation if the prisoner—like the public employee—
spoke “on a matter of public concern” and the government-as-jailor 
possessed no legitimate interest in restricting the prisoner’s speech.  
Aside from the fact that the Court’s precedent arguably left open 
what tests should apply to evaluate prisoners’ free speech retaliation 
claims, the Seventh Circuit’s application of the public concern and 
Pickering balancing tests to the prison context made some sense for 
three primary reasons.15 First, unlike the uncertain and confusing 
status of prisoners’ free speech rights, the Court specifically 
articulated a precise and well-defined test to evaluate free speech 
retaliation claims in the public employment context.16 Second, if the 
First Amendment restricted public employees’ free speech retaliation 
claims by a public concern test, then the First Amendment surely 
similarly restricted prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims unless 
courts reached the absurd result of potentially granting prisoners 
                                                                                                                   
741–42 (7th Cir. 2006); McElroy v. Force, 403 F.3d 855, 858–59 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(per curiam); Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1999), abrogated in 
part by Bridges, 557 F.3d 541. 
13 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
14 Id. 
15 See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 549–50 (observing that the Court’s public employee 
free speech jurisprudence neither expressly limited the public concern test to public 
employees’ free speech retaliation claims, nor definitely indicated that the test 
should apply to other free speech retaliation claims); supra note 11 and 
accompanying text. 
16 See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding it 
helpful to draw upon the public employee free speech jurisprudence to analyze other 
free speech retaliation claims because the bulk of First Amendment retaliation claims 
arose in the public employee setting); discussion infra Part I. 
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greater free speech rights than public employees.17 Third, the free 
speech rights of prisoners and public employees remained similarly 
situated in that both received less constitutional protection than normal 
citizens because the government’s unique interests in controlling both 
populations to effectively provide government services necessarily 
required both groups to accept certain limitations on their freedom of 
speech.18  
The Seventh Circuit, however, reconsidered its support for 
applying the public concern and Pickering balancing tests to prisoners’ 
free speech retaliation claims in Bridges v. Gilbert.19 The prisoner-
claimant, Jimmy Bridges, alleged that prison officials retaliated 
against him for providing an affidavit in a lawsuit brought by the 
estate of another inmate.20 In that prior lawsuit, Bridges averred his 
account of an incident involving prison officials’ alleged mistreatment 
of the other inmate while that inmate was gravely ill and later died.21 
The trial court dismissed Bridges’s complaint because his speech did 
not involve a matter of public concern since it only involved a matter 
personal to the estate of the other inmate.22 On appeal, Bridges urged 
the Seventh Circuit to reject its support of a public concern test for 
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claim in favor of the Turner test.23    
                                                 
17 See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 388 (commenting that the public concern 
requirement may be applicable to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims because 
“[p]risoners certainly do not have greater free speech rights than public 
employees.”). 
18 Compare supra note 1 and accompanying text, with Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 
(“When a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept 
certain limitations on his or her freedom.”). See generally Scott A. Moss, Students 
and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive 
Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 U.C.L.A L. REV 1635 
(2007) (observing that the low level of scrutiny the Court applied to prisoners’ and 
public employees’ free speech claims contrasted with the strict scrutiny standard the 
Court typically applied to government restrictions on free speech).  
19 See 557 F.3d at 546–52. 
20 Id. at 544.  
21 Id. at 544, 551.  
22 Bridges v. Huibregtse, No. 06-C-544-S, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2477, at *4 
(W.D. Wis. Jan. 8, 2007). 
23 Bridges, 557 F.3d at 547. 
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Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit agreed with Bridges and held that 
“a prisoner’s speech can be protected even when it does not involve a 
matter of public concern.”24 Instead, the Seventh Circuit purportedly 
adopted the Turner test to evaluate prisoners’ free speech retaliation 
claims.25 In reality, however, the Seventh Circuit analyzed Bridges’s 
free speech retaliation claim under the Pell test when it held that 
Bridges’s allegedly truthful speech about possible prison abuses was 
“not inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives” without 
applying the Turner test, its factors, standard of review, or explicit 
reference to the deference courts typically reserve for the judgment of 
prison officials.26 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit’s attempt to 
clarify the constitutional level of protection for prisoners’ free speech 
retaliation claims only left the ambiguous status of prisoners’ free 
speech rights as uncertain as ever.27  
This article analyzes and evaluates the Seventh Circuit’s opinion 
in Bridges v. Gilbert. Part I reviews the Court’s relevant First 
Amendment jurisprudence concerning prisoners’ free speech rights, 
while Part II examines the Court’s public employee free speech 
jurisprudence. Part III analyzes other federal circuits’ approaches to 
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims, while Part IV discusses the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims. 
Lastly, Part V evaluates the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bridges. Part 
V argues that the Seventh Circuit’s purported adoption of the Turner 
test plausibly conformed to Court precedent, but that Bridges 
effectively, and incorrectly, applied the Pell test to the prisoner’s free 
speech claim. Finally, Part V contends that the Seventh Circuit should 
have considered applying the public concern and Pickering balancing 
tests to adjudicate a prisoner’s speech on a matter of public-
penological concern against the government’s legitimate penological 
interests in restricting the prisoner’s speech. This approach proves 
more workable than the legitimate penological interests tests, protects 
                                                 
24 Id. at 551.  
25 Id. at 551–52. 
26 See id.; discussion infra Parts IV.C, V.B.  
27 See discussion infra Parts IV.C, V.B–C. 
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important free speech rights, and ensures that prisoners do not possess 
potentially broader free speech rights than public employees.  
 
I. THE COURT’S PRISONER FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE 
  
Whether prisoners even enjoyed the protection of the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment,28 the “Constitution’s most majestic 
guarantee,”29 remained in doubt for nearly 170 years.30 Since 
American prisons first developed in the early nineteenth century after 
the conception of the Constitution,31 courts initially applied the Bill of 
Rights only as “a declaration of general principles to govern a society 
of freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead.”32 One 
court famously treated convicted felons as “slaves of the State,” who 
possessed only those “personal rights . . . the law in its humanity 
accords . . . .”33 Also, because the early prototypical prison institutions 
strictly prohibited inmates from talking, engaging in communications 
with other prisoners, and receiving publications except for the Bible, 
considerable doubt remained over whether prisoners retained their free 
speech rights.34  
Early twentieth century prison reform movements relaxed these 
silence requirements and other prisoner speech restrictions due to 
then-prevailing beliefs that the harshness of prison life promoted 
recidivism by hardening prisoners to a criminal way of life.35 Yet, by 
the mid-twentieth century, society generally considered prisons’ 
rehabilitative efforts futile.36 Consequently, prisons primarily became 
                                                 
28 The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment states, “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.   
29 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1 (2d ed. 
1988). 
30 MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.02.  
31 Id. § 1.01.  
32 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 790, 796 (Va. 1871). 
33 Id.  
34 MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.01.  
35 Id.   
36 Id.   
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warehouses for society’s criminals with little regard for prisoners’ free 
speech rights or other conditions of confinement.37   
Furthermore, since courts deliberately refrained from questioning 
what constitutional rights survived incarceration as part of the so-
called hands-off doctrine, the law perpetuated the ambiguous status of 
prisoners’ free speech rights.38 Courts supported the hands-off 
doctrine because they believed judicial intervention into internal 
prison affairs implicated concerns about the separation of powers,39 
federalism,40 institutional expertise,41 and the unstated potential for 
boundless—and possibly meritles 42s—litigation.   
                                                
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ended the hands-off doctrine and 
permitted courts to adjudicate prisoners’ free speech claims against 
prison officials.43 Thus, the Court developed its prisoner free speech 
jurisprudence in cases like Pell v. Procunier44 and Turner v. Safley.45 
These cases established the possible tests for evaluating prisoners’ free 
speech retaliation claims, but they provided little definition or 
protection to prisoners’ free speech rights.46 As a result, the hands-off 
doctrine’s legacy on the uncertain status of prisoners’ free speech 
rights remained ever-present in the Court’s prisoner free speech 
 
37 Id.   
38 Id. § 1.02.  
39 Id. (commenting that concerns about the separation of powers existed 
because courts generally viewed the management and control of prisons as executive 
and legislative functions).  
40 Id. (commenting that considerations about federalism arose because many 
prisoner suits were brought in federal courts by state inmates, and federal courts did 
not want to tell states how to run their prisons).  
41 Id. (commenting that concerns about institutional expertise developed 
because courts believed that the management of prisons required considerable 
training, skill, and experience that only corrections officials possessed). 
42 Id. (commenting that concerns about litigation developed because of the 
large volume of idle prisoners).  
43 Id. § 1.03; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405–06 (1974) 
(“When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional 
guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.”). 
44 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
45 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  
46 See discussion infra Part I.A–C.  
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jurisprudence.47 Accordingly, Part I reviews Pell v. Procunier, Turner 
v. Safley, and the differences between the Pell and Turner tests. 
  
A. Pell v. Procunier 
Pell upheld a prison regulation prohibiting face-to-face 
communications between prison inmates and members of the press.48 
In analyzing the prisoners’ free speech claims,49 the Court initially 
noted that lawful incarceration necessarily restricted the rights and 
privileges of prisoners.50 As a corollary to that principle, the Pell 
Court announced its test that “a prison inmate retains those First 
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a 
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the 
corrections system.”51 The Pell Court, however, did not consider the 
existence of prisoners’ free speech rights to communicate with the 
journalists survived their imprisonment.52 Instead, the Pell Court 
assumed that the prisoners possessed a free speech right to 
communicate with the journalists, and proceeded to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the prison regulation in light of the prison’s 
legitimate penological objectives.53  
Next, the Pell Court identified three generally legitimate 
penological interests: (1) the deterrence of crime; (2) the rehabilitation 
of prisoners; and (3) the maintenance of internal security 
                                                 
47 See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.04. 
48 Pell, 417 U.S. at 827–28, 835. This comment does not analyze the press 
officials’ more famous First Amendment challenge. 
49 The Pell prisoners asserted a free speech right to communicate their views to 
any willing listener, which included a willing representative of the press for the 
purpose of publication by a willing publisher. Id. at 822. The Court assumed that the 
Free Speech Clause protected such a right. Id.   
50 Id. (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)). 
51 Id.  
52 Id.; see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (commenting that 
Pell refrained from deciding whether the asserted First Amendment right survived 
incarceration because the prison regulation was a reasonable exercise of the prison 
officials’ judgment as to the appropriate means of furthering penological goals).  
53 Pell, 417 U.S. at 822.  
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considerations within the prison institutions.54 Then, the Court upheld 
the prison restrictions because they furthered these legitimate 
penological objectives.55 First, the Court determined that the 
restrictions deterred crime because isolating prisoners in presumably 
undesirable conditions reasonably deterred prisoners and others from 
committing additional criminal offenses.56 Second, the restrictions 
furthered prisoners’ rehabilitation and maintained prison security 
because the corrections officers believed that the restrictions allowed 
the inmates to have personal contact with people who aided their 
rehabilitation while not compromising the security concerns inherent 
in face-to-face communications.57 Thus, in evaluating whether the 
prison restrictions served the legitimate penological objectives, Pell 
deferred to the “expert judgment” of the corrections officers absent 
“substantial evidence in the record to indicate . . . the officials . . . 
exaggerated their response to [the legitimate penological] 
considerations.”58 Pell also considered the regulation as a reasonable 
time, place, and manner restriction because it was content-neutral and 
allowed prisoners alternative means of communicating with 
outsiders.59 
Ultimately, the Pell Court’s failure to apply the Pell test left 
future courts without any definition or explanation of what free speech 
rights, if any, actually survived incarceration.60 Instead, the Court 
generally adopted Pell’s approach to solely evaluate the validity of 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 827–28. 
56 Id. at 822. The Court’s reasoning under the legitimate penological interest of 
deterring crime placed no real limiting principle on the types of permissible prison 
restrictions because any restriction on prisoners’ free speech rights would make 
conditions less desirable and thereby deter crime. See id.; cf. also Beard v. Banks, 
548 U.S. 541, 546 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the deprivation 
theory of rehabilitation possessed no limiting principle because any deprivation of a 
prisoner’s constitutional right provided the prisoner an incentive to improve his or 
her behavior and the theoretical opportunity to have the right restored with improved 
behavior). However, no case since Pell disavowed this reasoning.     
57 Pell, 417 U.S. at 822, 827. 
58 Id. at 827. 
59 Id. at 823–27. 
60 See id. at 822; supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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contested prison regulations on prisoners’ asserted First Amendment 
right under a very deferential, rational basis standard of review.61 The 
Court formally adopted this approach in Turner v. Safley.62 
  
B. Turner v. Safley 
In a 5–4 decision written by Justice O’Connor, Turner upheld a 
prison regulation prohibiting correspondence between inmates in the 
prison system unless the correspondence was between immediate 
family members or concerned legal matters, but invalidated a prison 
regulation that essentially prohibited inmates from marrying anyone.63 
Turner expressly resolved the constitutional standard of review for 
evaluating the validity of prison regulations that infringed upon the 
free speech rights of prisoners.64 Specifically, Turner rejected 
evaluating contested prison regulations under a heightened or 
intermediate level of scrutiny.65 Instead, Turner announced a rational 
basis standard of review and its test by declaring that “when a prison 
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is 
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”66 
Additionally, Turner established four relevant factors that courts 
should consider when evaluating the reasonableness of the contested 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (observing that the 
Court generally adopted Pell’s refusal to consider if the prisoner’s asserted right 
survived incarceration, and instead evaluated the reasonableness of the prison 
restrictions on the asserted right).  
62 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
63 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987).  
64 Id. at 86, 89. Turner also announced the constitutional standard for 
evaluating a regulation that restricted prisoners’ due process right to marry. Id. at 89.  
65 Id. In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) abrogated in part by 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989), the Court applied an 
intermediate level of scrutiny to invalidate a prison regulation that restricted the free 
speech rights of non-inmates based solely on the First Amendment rights of the non-
prison population. Thornburgh applied Turner’s rational basis review to prisoners’ 
incoming communications even from non-prisoners, but left undecided the standard 
of review for restrictions on prisoners’ outgoing communications to non-prisoners. 
490 U.S. at 413–14.  
66 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
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prison regulation.67 “First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ 
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest 
put forward to justify it.”68 Framed differently, the rational or logical 
connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate, content-
neutral, penological interest cannot remain “so remote as to render the 
policy arbitrary or irrational.”69 Second, Turner considered the 
existence of “alternative means of exercising the right that remain 
open to prison inmates.”70 Third, Turner analyzed “the impact 
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards 
and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources 
generally.”71 Fourth, Turner stated that “the absence of ready 
alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.”72  
In Turner, the correspondence restriction was supported by each 
of the factors, according to the Court’s rational basis review.73 First, 
the correspondence regulation was logically connected to the prison’s 
valid security concerns because the prison officials claimed that they 
implemented the regulation to control communications about escape, 
assault, violence, and gang-related plans.74 Second, the 
correspondence regulation allowed inmates alternative means of 
expression because it only barred communication between “a limited 
class of other people.”75 Third, since the Turner prison officials 
testified that accommodating the prisoners’ correspondence rights 
entailed significant security risks to guards and inmates, the Court 
deferred to the prison officials’ expert judgment in enacting the prison 
                                                 
67 Id.   
68 Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).  
69 Id. at 89–90.  
70 Id. at 90.  
71 Id. at 92–93.  
72 Id. at 90. Under this factor, the inmate possessed the burden of proving the 
contested regulation was an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns, which the 
inmate could accomplish by pointing to an “alternative that fully accommodates the 
prisoner’s rights at a de minimis cost to valid penological interests.” Id. at 90–91.   
73 Id. at 91–93. 
74 Id. at 91–92.  
75 Id. at 92.  
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regulation.76 Fourth, the proposed alternative of having the prison 
officials monitor and screen the correspondence imposed more than a 
de minimis cost due to the administrative difficulties and risk of error 
in missing dangerous messages.77 
Turner’s test and its analysis definitively established a rational 
basis standard of review for evaluating prisoners’ free speech claims.78 
The Turner Court granted prisoners’ free speech claims the lowest 
level of First Amendment protection to advance the Court’s policy of 
judicial restraint in prison affairs.79 The Court, motivated by the same-
old concerns about the separation of powers,80 institutional 
expertise,81 and federalism,82 decided that rational basis review 






                                                
83 Rational basis review not only allowed courts to 
refrain from the awkward position of second-guessing prison officials,
but it also provided prison officials with confidence that they would
not have to second-guess “their ability to anticipate security problems 
and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of pris
administration.”84 Consequently, some commentators argued that 
Turner’s rational basis review marked a return to the thoroughly 
 
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 93.  
78 Id. at 89.  
79 Id. at 85. 
80 Id. at 84–85 (“Prison administration is . . . a task that has been committed to 
the responsibility of [the legislative and executive] branches, and separation of 
powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”).   
81 Id. (“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires 
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources.”). Additionally, the Court 
commented that “‘courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent 
problems of prison administration and reform.’ . . . ‘[T]he problems of prisons in 
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily 
susceptible of resolution by decree.’” Id. at 84 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U.S. 396, 404–5 (1974)).   
82 Id. at 85 (“Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have . . . 
additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”). 
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discredited hands-off doctrine.85 At the least, rational basis review 
ensured that courts recognized and protected fewer prisoners’ free 
speech rights.86   
Moreover, while Turner neglected to consider if prisoners 
retained a constitutional right to free speech under the Pell test,87 the 
Turner Court applied the Pell test to expressly hold that prisoners’ 
right to marry was not inconsistent with the prisoners’ status or the 
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.88 In 
applying the Pell test, the Turner Court reasoned that the right to 
marry survived incarceration because many of the incidents of 
marriage remained “unaffected by the fact of confinement or the 
pursuit of legitimate corrections goals.”89 Some of the incidents of 
marriage that survived incarceration included personal expressions of 
emotional support, public commitment, and religious faith.90 The 
Turner Court, however, made no mention of a rational basis standard 
of review, the appropriate level of deference to apply to prison 
officials’ contrary contentions, or the Turner factors when it 
considered whether the prisoners’ right to marry was inconsistent with 
                                                 
85 See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.04 (citing Cheryl Dunn Giles, Turner v. Safley 
and Its Progeny: A Gradual Retreat to the “Hands-Off” Doctrine?, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 
219 (1993)). 
86 Id.  
87 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84. The Court expressly noted that prisoners retained 
at least three constitutional rights: First, the right to petition the government for the 
redress of grievances under Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); second, the right 
to protection against invidious racial discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause under Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); and third, the right 
to the protections of due process under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
The Court, however, never mentioned that prisoners retained their free speech rights. 
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.   
88 Id. at 95 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822). 
89 Id. at 96. 
90 Turner found four incidents of marriage survived incarceration. Id. at 95–96. 
First, inmate marriages, like other marriages, were personal expressions of emotional 
support and public commitment. Id. Second, inmate marriages may also be 
expressions of religious faith. Id. at 96. Third, inmates may marry with the 
expectation of later consummating their marriage once they were eventually 
released. Id. Fourth, marital status conferred the receipt of certain important 
government benefits. Id.  
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legitimate penological objectives.91 At the same time, however, the 
Turner Court also appeared to support a total prohibition on the right 
to marry if the prohibition formed part of the punishment for the 
prisoner’s crime.92 Thus, the Court’s analysis of what constitutional 
rights survived incarceration remained unclear.93 
Finally, after the Turner Court used the Pell test to hold that 
prisoners retained the right to marry, the Court applied the Turner test 
to invalidate the prison’s marriage restrictions under its rational basis 
review.94 Unlike the Court’s application of the Turner test to the 
correspondence restrictions, the Court seemed less willing to defer to 
the prison officials’ judgments about the rational relationship between 
the marriage restrictions and the prison’s legitimate penological 
objectives.95 First, the Court held that the marriage restrictions 
possessed no reasonable relation to the prison officials’ asserted 
interests in preventing the security threat from “love triangles” and 
promoting the rehabilitation of female convicts entangled in 
excessively dependent relationships with dangerous men.96 Second, 
the Court did not expressly consider the reasonableness of the 
                                                 
91 See id. at 95–96. 
92 See id. at 96 (distinguishing Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974), 
summarily aff’g Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. N.Y. 1974)). 
Currently, only Justices Thomas and Scalia expressly support this view. See, e.g., 
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 139–41 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(evaluating prisoners’ challenges to deprivations of their asserted rights solely under 
the Eighth Amendment).   
93 See James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of 
Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV 97, 107 (2006) (discussing the Court’s lack 
of clarity in what rights survive incarceration). 
94 Id. at 97–99. 
95 See id. at 91–93, 97–99. 
96 Id. at 98–99. Regarding the security justification, the Court held that the 
marriage restriction was too broad because “love triangles” could exist independent 
of marriage relationships. Id. at 98. For the rehabilitation interest, the Court similarly 
held that the marriage restriction was too broad because it encompassed inmate-
civilian marriages and male inmate marriages. Id. at 99. Obviously, the 
correspondence regulation was too broad in that it blocked non-dangerous 
communications; however, the Court still found the ban “logically connected” to the 
prison’s legitimate security concerns. See id. at 91–92.  
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marriage restriction under Turner’s second factor, but the restriction 
necessarily left inmates with some alternative means of exercising 
their right to marry by not completely prohibiting inmate marriages.97 
Lastly, the Court found the third and fourth factors showed that the 
marriage restriction possessed no reasonable relation to the prison’s 
legitimate interests largely because the Court reasoned that 
accommodating non-dangerous marriages posed no security risks.98 
Thus, Turner itself demonstrated the important differences and 
consequences between the Pell and Turner tests. Part C discusses 
these differences in greater detail. 
   
C. The Differences Between the Pell and Turner Tests Produced 
Important Consequences for Prisoners’ Free Speech Rights  
The Pell and Turner tests asked different questions, contained 
markedly different analysis, and produced different consequences with 
respect to protecting prisoners’ rights.99 While the Turner test 
possessed a relatively well-defined framework of analysis and 
standard of review that compelled courts to substantially defer to 
prison officials’ determinations about the reasonableness of restricting 
prisoners’ rights, the Pell test lacked definition, a specific standard of 
review, and further allowed courts to make their own determinations 
of proper prison administration.100 Consequently, the Turner test 
                                                 
97 See id. at 99. Since the Court claimed the marriage restriction formed an 
“almost complete ban on the decision to marry,” it apparently left some alternative 
means of exercising the right and should have passed under this second factor. See 
id. at 92, 99.  
98 Id. at 97–98. Under the third factor, because the Court determined the 
marriage decision was a completely private decision that did not reasonably impact 
the prison’s security concerns, the impact of accommodating the right to marry failed 
to trigger a significant “ripple effect” on other inmates and prison officials. Id. at 98. 
Under the fourth factor, the marriage regulation had an easy alternative to 
accommodate the right to marry at a de minimus cost because inmates could marry 
unless the warden specifically determined the marriage presented a security risk. Id. 
at 97–98.  
99 See discussion supra Part I.B; discussion infra Parts I.C, III.B–C, V.B. 
100 See discussion supra Part I.B; discussion infra Parts I.C, III.B–C, V.B. 
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recognized few prisoners’ rights, but the Pell test is vague—it may 
recognize many prisoners’ rights or no rights whatsoever.101  
Essentially, the Pell test determined if prisoners possessed a given 
First Amendment right, while the Turner test evaluated the 
reasonableness of restricting that given right.102 In the prisoner free 
speech retaliation claim context, courts applying the Pell test should 
ask if the prisoner’s right to exercise free speech without government 
retaliation remained “not inconsistent with [the prisoner’s] status as a 
prisoner or the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections 
system.”103 In contrast, courts applying the Turner test to a prisoner’s 
free speech retaliation claim should ask if the prison’s allegedly 
retaliatory actions were “reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”104  
Accordingly, the Pell test largely operated as a threshold to the 
Turner test.105 If a prisoner’s free speech retaliation claim failed to 
pass the Pell test, then courts need not question the reasonableness of 
restricting the prisoner’s speech under the Turner test because the 
prisoner possessed no actual right to a free speech retaliation claim, 
and judicial deference to prison officials should be nearly absolute.106 
But, if the prisoner’s asserted free speech right passed the Pell test and 
survived imprisonment, then courts could still apply the Turner test to 
determine the reasonableness of restricting the prisoner’s speech.107 Of 
course, if the court’s Pell inquiry determined that prisoners possessed 
                                                 
101 See discussion supra Part I.B; discussion infra Parts I.C, III.B–C, V.B. 
102 See discussion supra Part I.A–B.      
103 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); discussion supra Part I.A.  
104 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; discussion supra Part I.B. 
105 See, e.g., Pell, 417 U.S. at 822; Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 
(2006) (finding under the Pell test that prisoners retained their Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection right against invidious racial discrimination, and 
remanding to evaluate the prisoner’s claim under strict scrutiny review rather than 
Turner’s rational basis review).  
106 See, e.g., Pell, 417 U.S. at 822; Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 
1033 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that when the prisoner’s asserted right was found not to 
exist in the prison context because it was inherently inconsistent with legitimate 
penological objectives, there could not be any actual invasion of the purported right, 
and judicial deference to prison officials should be nearly absolute). 
107 See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 95–99. 
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a protected right to speak freely without retaliation, then the court 
would perhaps be more willing to protect that right against 
governmental restrictions—as demonstrated by Turner.108  
The standard of review and level of deference courts respectively 
applied to prisoners’ free speech claims and prison officials’ 
contentions about prison administration marked one critical distinction 
between the Pell and Turner tests. The Turner test specifically formed 
a definite framework, with a four-factor test and rational basis 
standard of review.109 In fact, Turner’s factors and its analysis 
explicitly instructed courts to defer to the prison officials’ 
considerations of whether the prison’s actions reasonably related to the 
prison’s legitimate interests.110 Conversely, the Court failed to develop 
a definite framework or standard of review when it applied the Pell 
test.111 By itself, the Pell test remained an indeterminate and 
“superficial formula” that failed to identify what constitutional rights 
survived incarceration.112 Consequently, courts applying just the Pell 
test tended to make their own judgments about proper prison 
administration.113 
For instance, in Johnson v. California,114 the Court recently 
applied just the Pell test to hold that prisoners retained their 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection right against invidious racial 
discrimination.115 In so holding, the Court rejected evaluating the 
                                                 
108 See id. (applying the Pell test to find that prisoners retained the right to 
marry and further invalidating the marriage restrictions under the Turner test, but 
applying the Turner test to uphold the correspondence restrictions); supra notes 96–
98 and accompanying text.  
109 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
110 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
111 See discussion supra Parts I.A–B. 
112 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
113 See discussion supra Part I.B; discussion infra Parts I.C., III.B–C, IV.C, 
V.B. 
114 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
115 Id. at 510–11. Johnson also asserted in dicta the less controversial claim that 
a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment 
survived incarceration. Id. Whether rights other than those considered in Johnson 
survived incarceration remains undetermined, but recent evidence suggested courts 
confined Johnson’s reasoning to racial discrimination and Eighth Amendment 
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prison’s unwritten policy of initially segregating prisoners’ cell mates 
by race under Turner’s rational basis review, and remanded the case to 
review the prison’s policy under strict scrutiny like all government 
racial classifications.116 The Johnson Court held that prisoners 
retained their Equal Protection Clause right against racial 
discrimination because such a right need not “necessarily be 
compromised for the sake of proper prison administration . . . . [s
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination is not only 
consistent with proper prison administration, but also bolsters the 
legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system.”
ince] 
 officials’ contrary contentions.   
                                                                                                                  
117 The Johnson 
Court’s reasoning cited precedent concerning the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the criminal justice system; but, like Turner’s 
application of the Pell test to the right to marry, Johnson made no 
mention of the standard of review or the level of deference courts 
should apply to the prison 118
In dissent, Justice Thomas harshly criticized the Court’s use of the 
Pell test.119 Justice Thomas argued that the majority ignored precedent 
and wise policy by making its own ill-considered judgment about 
proper prison administration, instead of expressly deferring to the 
expert judgment of prison officials.120 According to Justice Thomas, 
the Pell test necessarily required courts to make their own judgments 
about proper prison administration because, “[f]or a court to know 
whether any particular right is inconsistent with proper prison 
administration, it must have some implicit notion of what a proper 
 
claims. See Robertson, supra note 93, at 108 (analyzing recent prisoner rights cases). 
This comment, however, contends that the federal circuits applied Johnson’s 
reasoning to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims. See discussion supra Parts 
III.B–C; IV.C, V.B. 
116 Id. at 515. 
117 Id. at 510–11. 
118 Id. (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979); Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986)); see also Robertson, supra note 93, at 107 (discussing 
Johnson’s failure to further elaborate or identify why rights remained fundamentally 
inconsistent with incarceration); discussion supra Part I.B. 
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prison ought to look like and how it ought to be administered.”121 Yet, 
Justice Thomas argued that the Court specifically developed and 
routinely applied the Turner test because precedent and wise policy 
dictated that courts should not make judgments about proper prison 
administration.122 Thus, Justice Thomas believed that the Pell test 
remained irreparably inconsistent with the Court’s precedent and 
policy of deference to prison officials.123   
The other critical difference between the Pell and Turner tests 
concerned how they evaluated the prisoners’ asserted rights. Both tests 
“refused to recognize any hierarchy of values among important 
constitutionally protected interests”124 and balance the prisoners’ 
rights against the government’s legitimate penological interests by 
always elevating any penological concern to “a higher constitutional 
plane than [the asserted constitutional] rights.”125 In Shaw v. Murphy, 
the Court specifically rejected a prison inmate’s attempt to enhance the 
First Amendment protection of his speech about important legal 
                                                 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See id. Justice Thomas advocated an approach examining the history of 
incarceration to determine if prisoners forfeited their asserted rights as a condition of 
their punishment. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 141–45 (2003) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). This approach, however, remained just as indeterminate as 
the Pell test because the history of incarceration constantly evolved to restrict or 
accommodate prisoners’ free speech rights depending on then-prevailing beliefs 
about whether such measures best achieved legitimate penological objectives. See 
discussion supra Part I.   
124 MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.04; Robertson, supra note 93, at 119–20 
(“[Turner’s] first [factor] functions as the leveler of rights by drawing no distinction 
between “weak” (non-fundamental) and “strong” (fundamental) rights.”). 
125 Robertson, supra note 93, at 119–20 (“[Turner’s] first [factor’s] 
commitment to rationality, the sine qua non of the test, has a clear subtext: 
Reasonable means of achieving goals, including petty goals, trump rights. Indeed, 
penal goals acquire the status of categorical imperatives.”). Robertson further 
described the Turner test as “faux-balancing” because the Turner test “deceptively 
suggests balancing,” but the first factor controlled the outcome of the remaining 
factors and was generally contrived “to foreordain a finding against the prisoner’s 
constitutional claim.” Id. (quoting Lynn S. Branham, “Go and Sin No More”: The 
Constitutionality of Governmentally Funded Faith-Based Prison Units, 37 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 291, 297 (2004)).  
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matters—or balance the value of the prisoner’s speech against the 
prison’s legitimate interests—because such approaches contravened 
the Turner test’s singular concern with the rational relationship 
between the prison’s actions and its legitimate objectives.126 Similarly, 
the Pell test, by definition, refrained from assigning any weight or 
value to the prisoner’s asserted free speech rights beyond those rights’ 
mere consistency to the prison’s legitimate penological interests.127 
Yet, although the Turner test deliberately ignored the identity, nature, 
or existence of prisoners’ asserted rights by solely focusing on the 
rational relationship between the prison’s actions and its legitimate 
penological interests, the Pell test necessarily required courts to 
consider the identity, nature, and existence of prisoners’ asserted free 
speech rights to determine whether they remained consistent with 
incarceration.128  
For instance, when the Turner Court applied just the Turner test 
to the prisoner’s free speech claim, the Court assumed that the prisoner 
retained a First Amendment right to correspond with other inmates 
without any further discussion or analysis of why prisoners retained 
such free speech rights.129 Conversely, when the Turner Court applied 
the Pell test to the prisoner’s right to marry claim, the Court 
exhaustively considered the identity, nature, and incidents of the right 
to marry and whether such incidents remained applicable in the prison 
setting.130 Since the Turner test refused to question the identity or 
quality of prisoners’ free speech rights, the Turner test had the effect 
of ignoring prisoners’ free speech rights with the consequence of 
                                                 
126 See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229–30 (2001). In Shaw, the 
prisoner contested prison rules that prevented him, as a high-security inmate, from 
offering legal assistance to a minimum-security prisoner. Id. at 225 n. 1. Since the 
prison rules possessed a reasonable relation to the prison’s legitimate security 
interests, the Court upheld the rules. Id. at 229–30. The Court expressly rejected an 
attempt to balance the importance of the prisoner’s right, or the value of the content 
of the prisoner’s speech, against the importance of the penological interests served 
by the prison rule. Id. at 229 n.2. 
127 See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.04. 
128 See discussion supra Parts I.A–C; discussion infra Parts III.B–C, IV.C.  
129 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 89 (1987).  
130 Id. at 95–96; supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.  
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recognizing fewer prisoner free speech rights in practice.131 
Contrarily, when the Turner Court had to consider the nature and 
actual existence of the prisoner’s asserted right under the Pell test, the 







oners’ free speech retaliation claims a 
pyrr
                                                
ictions.132  
Interestingly, the Court’s applications of the Pell test suggested 
that prisoners should retain their free speech rights.133 Undoub
prisoners’ free speech rights encompassed the same personal 
expressions of emotional support, public commitment, and religious 
faith that survived incarceration as incidents of marriage.134 In fact, 
prisoner speech helped inform the public about how the government 
operated prisons,135 checked government abuses of power by priso
officials,136 contributed to the “marketplace of ideas,”137 reduce
recidivism,138 and further enabled the political participation of 
“discrete and insular minorities.”139 Not surprisingly, then, courts 
consistently applied the Pell test to find that many of the incidents 
free speech remained consistent with incarceration.140 Yet, courts 
applying the Pell test could just as easily conclude that prisoners’ fr
speech rights remained inconsistent with incarceration, making the 
application of the Pell test to pris
hic victory for prisoners.141  
Ultimately, the differences between the Pell and Turner tests 
produced markedly divergent consequences with respect to protecting 
 
131 See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.04; discussion supra Part I.B–C.  
132 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
133 See discussion supra Parts I.B–C. 
134 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
135 See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 5.00. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See Jessica Feierman, Creative Prison Lawyering: From Silence to 
Democracy, 11 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 250 n.7 (2004). 
139 See id. at 249, 269, 271 (arguing that prisoners as a class consisted of a 
discrete and insular minority and individual prisoners typically belonged to discrete 
and insular minorities); MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 1.03 n.43 (citing United States v. 
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
140 See discussion supra Parts III.B–C, IV.C.  
141 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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prisoners’ rights or deferring to prison officials. While the Turner te
may defer too much to prison officials’ judgments about prisoners
rights, the indeterminacy of the Pell test may produce a similarly 
extreme deference or the unfortunate consequence of unduly impedi
prison officials in performing their legitimate and necessary public 
services. Before discussing how the federal circuits’ approaches to
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims further demonstrated the 
important differences between the Pell and Turner tests, this comme







claims in the highly restrictive context of public employment. 








                                                
 
Unlike the Court’s prisoner free speech jurisprudence, the Co
clearly established the test for analyzing public employees’ free 
speech retaliation claims in the cases Pickering v. Board of Education
of Township High School District 205,142 Connick v. Meyers,143 and 
Garcetti v. Ceballos.144 These cases formed a two-step approach for 
evaluating public employees’ free speech retaliation claims: Firs
public employee must “speak as a citizen on a matter of publ
concern” (the “public concern test”); and second, the public 
employee’s free speech interests must outweigh the government’s 
interest—as an employer—in restricting the speech to effectively 
provide public services (the “Pickering balancing test”).145 If the 
public employee failed to speak as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, then the employee possessed no free speech retaliation claim, 
and courts dismissed the claim without even engaging in the Pickering
balancing test.146 Although this two-step approach provided public
employees with less constitutional protection for their free speech 
rights than normal citizens, the tests critically identified and preserved 
important free speech rights while not unduly interfering with essential
 
142 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
143 461 U.S. 138 (1983).  
144 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
145 See, e.g., id. at 418. 
146 See id. 
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government interests by performing its categorical public concer
ad hoc Pickering balancing tests.
n and 
reviews the Court’s public employee free speech jurisprudence. 












                                                
147 Thus, this comment briefly 
 
ard of Education of T
  
Pickering held that a public school teacher’s dismissal for sendin
a letter to a local newspaper that criticized the way the school board
and district superintendent handled past revenue raising proposa
violated the teacher’s First Amendment right to free speech.148 
Pickering unequivocally rejected the old dogma that public employees 
waived their constitutional rights as citizens to comment on matte
public concern even when those matters were connected to their 
public employment.149 On the other hand, Pickering noted that “t
State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of i
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in 
general.”150 Thus, Pickering instructed courts to balance “the inter
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
iency of the public services it performs through its employees.”151
In striking this Pickering balance, the Court specially protec
speech on a matter of public concern.152 Specifically, the Court 
 
147 See Moss, supra note 18, at 1639; discussion infra Part II.   
148 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 564–
65 (1968). 
149 Id. at 568 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967) 
(“The theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be 
subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly 
rejected.”)); see also Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“[T]he 
unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions 
placed upon the terms of employment . . . including those which restricted the 
exercise of constitutional rights.”). 
150 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
151 Id. 
152 See id. at 568, 573. 
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declared that “[t]he public’s interest in having free and unhindered 
debate on matters of public importance [remained] the core value of 
the Free Speech Clause.”153 The Pickering Court also noted that the
Court especially protected speech on a matter of public concern in 
other free speech contexts when it weakened the protections public 















                                                
154 and the protections individuals received 
against invasions of privacy when the invasive statement involved a
matter of public interest.155 Furthermore, the Court recognized that 
public employees, “as a class, [were] the members of a community 
most likely to possess informed and definite opinions” on the public 
questions related to their employment.156 Since the informed opinions 
of public employees on matters of public concern remained critical to 
the “free and open debate . . . vital to informed decision-making by th
electorate,” the Court found it “essential that [public emplo
able to speak out f
liation].”157  
On the other side of the Pickering balance, the Court considered 
the government’s interest in promoting the efficiency, integrity, and
proper discipline of its employees.158 Consequently, the Pickering 
Court established a number of relevant factors in evaluating th
of the employee’s speech on the government’s interests as an 
employer.159 Pickering noted that the government’s interests in 
restricting the employee’s speech were stronger when the employee’s
speech was (1) directed to people the employee shared daily contact
with, (2) adversely affected discipline by immediate supervi
disrupted workplace harmony, (3) impeded the employee’s 
performance of duties or interfered with the regular operations of 
 
153 Id. at 573 (emphasis added). 
154 Id. at 573–74. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). 
155 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573–74. See generally Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 
374 (1967). 
156 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.  
157 Id. at 571–72. 
158 Id. at 568; see also Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 150–51 (1983).  
159 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569–70. 
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workplace, and (4) the employer-employee relationship was of
personal and intimate nature necessarily requiring loyalty and 






additional weight to the 
government’s unique interests.163  





speech retaliation claim by holding that the ADA did not engage in 
                                                
160 Since the Pickering employee’s 
speech “only tangentially and insubstantially” involved matters related 
to his employment, the Pickering balance favored the e
eak as a citizen on a matter of public concern.161  
Thus, Pickering demonstrated how the Court protected critically 
important First Amendment speech while not unduly interfering with 
the government’s unique interests in restricting that speech.162 Late
in Connick and Garcetti, the Court refined the public concer
Pickering balancing tests to afford 
 
 
Connick definitively established that a public employee’s 
must involve a matter of public concern to even merit further 
adjudication in the form of the Pickering balancing test.164 In Connick, 
an Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) was fired after she conte
position transfer by writing and distributing a questionnaire that 
solicited the views of her fellow staff members about office transfer 
policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level o
confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to 
work in political campaigns.165 The Court dismissed the ADA’s free
 
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 574. 
162 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
163 See discussion supra Part II.B–C. 
164 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 154. Connick still held that the First Amendment 
afforded limited protection to public employee speech that did not involve a matter 
of public concern. Id. However, Connick claimed that the federal judiciary possessed 
virtually no role in adjudicating public employee speech that did not involve a matter 
of public concern, and should defer to the employer’s personnel decisions “absent 
the most unusual circumstances.” Id.   
165 Id. at 140–42. 
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protected speech.166 Specifically, Connick held that “[w]hen employee 
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community, government 
officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without 
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First 
Amendment.”167 Thus, Connick deferred to the employer’s interests 
by (1) refusing to engage in the Pickering balance when the 
employee’s speech did not involve a matter of public conc
strengthening the government’s interests in the Pickering balance 
when the context of the employee’s speech about matters of public 
concern directly implicated the employer’s interests in performing 
public services.
ern and (2) 
                                                
168  
Furthermore, Connick clarified two additional factors for courts to 
consider when performing the Pickering balancing test. First, Connick 
noted that “the state’s burden in justifying a particular discharge 
varie[d] depending upon the nature of the employee’s expression.”169 
Hence, when the employee’s speech concerned itself more with 
causing insubordination and disrupting close working relationships 
than matters of public concern, the Court afforded “a wide degree of 
deference to the employer’s judgment.”170 This deference allowed the 
employer to prevent the employee from disrupting the office and 
destroying working relationships before such events unfolded.171 
Second, Connick considered the time, place, and manner of the 
 
166 Id. at 147–49, 154. Specifically, Connick held that the ADA’s speech about 
pressure to work in political campaigns entailed a matter of public concern, but that 
all the other speech merely reflected her personal grievances with internal office 
policy. Id. Accordingly, the Court applied the Pickering balance test to the ADA’s 
speech about pressure to work in political campaigns, but the Court favored the 
employer’s interests, because the ADA’s speech was designed to cause 
insubordination among the close working relationships essential to perform the 
public services. Id. at 151–52.  
167 Id. at 146. 
168 Id. at 146–47, 150–53. 
169 Id. at 150. 
170 Id. at 151–52. 
171 Id. at 152. 
 184
26
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
employee’s speech.172 Speech at the workplace, especially if it 
violated office policy, tilted the balance in favor of the government’s 
interest in institutional efficiency.173 In Garcetti, the Court further 
strengthened the employer’s interest in restricting “workplace speech” 
by categorically removing such speech from any First Amendment 
protection.174 
 
C. Garcetti v. Ceballos 
Garcetti held that “when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline.”175 In 
Garcetti, a deputy district attorney complained that he suffered 
retaliation for writing a memorandum about misrepresentations in a 
warrant affidavit, speaking to his supervisors about his opinions, and 
testifying for the defense at a suppression hearing concerning the 
warrant.176 Since the employee’s speech “owe[d] its existence to [the] 
 . . . employee’s professional responsibilities,” government restrictions 
on the employee’s speech failed to implicate “any liberties the 
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”177  
The Garcetti Court removed an employee’s speech about matters 
of public concern from First Amendment protection because 
“[e]mployers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by 
an employee in his or her professional capacity.”178 Since 
“government employers . . . need a significant degree of control over 
their employees’ words and actions” to efficiently provide public 
services,179 the Court substantially deferred to the government’s 
                                                 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 152–53. 
174 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); discussion infra Part 
II.C.  
175 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
176 Id. at 413–15. 
177 Id. at 421–22. 
178 Id. at 422. 
179 Id. at 418. 
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interests by removing employees’ speech from constitutional 
protection.180 The Court further refrained from adjudicating 
employees’ speech made pursuant to their official duties because a 
contrary ruling would “demand permanent judicial intervention in the 
conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with 
sound principles of federalism and the separation of powers.”181  
Hence, the Court’s public employee free speech jurisprudence 
showed that courts can provide definition and protection to free 
speech rights while also affording substantial deference to the 
government’s unique interests in restricting free speech rights. 
Unfortunately, the federal circuits’ approaches to prisoners’ free 
speech retaliation claims failed to accomplish the same results by not 
extending the public concern and Pickering balancing tests to 
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims.  
 
III. THE APPROACHES OF OTHER FEDERAL CIRCUITS TO PRISONERS’ 
FREE SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIMS 
Interestingly, none of the federal circuits expressly held that the 
public concern test applied to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims, 
but none of the circuits explicitly held the opposite until the Seventh 
Circuit decided Bridges.182 Only the Sixth Circuit exhaustively 
considered whether the public concern test should apply to prisoners’ 
First Amendment retaliation claims before ultimately leaving the 
question undecided.183 The Second and Third Circuits doubted the 
applicability of the public concern test to the prison context by merely 
commenting, without much explanation, that prisoners’ First 
Amendment retaliation claims typically addressed matters of personal 
                                                 
180 See id. at 422–23. 
181 Id. at 423. Presumably, the federalism concerns developed from federal 
courts adjudicating the First Amendment claims of state employees, while the 
separation of powers concerns derived from courts interfering with the public offices 
of the other co-equal branches of government. See id.  
182 See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 550–51 (7th Cir. 2009); Thaddeus-X 
v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999). 
183 See discussion infra Part III.A.  
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concern.184 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits summarily applied the Pell 
test to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims without even 
considering the public concern test.185 In so doing, the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits’ approaches shared many similarities to the Seventh 
Circuit approach in Bridges. Thus, this comment discusses the 
approaches of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits to prisoners’ free 
speech retaliation claims. 
 
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Approach to Prisoner Free Speech 
Retaliation Claims 
In Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, the Sixth Circuit thoroughly discussed 
the history and purpose of the prisoner and public employee free 
speech doctrines when the court considered whether it should adopt 
the public concern test for prisoners’ First Amendment retaliation 
claims.186 Specifically, the court expressly distinguished between 
prisoners’ free speech rights and their right to access the courts under 
the First Amendment’s Petition Clause.187 The court reasoned that 
prisoners possessed a “well-established constitutional right to access 
the courts,”188 which definitely and clearly survived incarceration 
unlike the “less clear . . . contours of free speech rights in the prison 
setting.”189 Thus, the court held that no authority existed to further 
limit prisoners’ “most ‘fundamental political right’ [to access the 
                                                 
184 See Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to 
extend the public concern test to prisoners’ petitions for redress of grievances 
because such petitions typically addressed matters of personal concern); cf. also 
Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 283–84 (3d Cir. 2004) (refusing 
to extend the public concern requirement to a private citizen’s free speech retaliation 
claim; and, commenting in dicta that the Third Circuit permitted prisoners’ free 
speech retaliation claims without applying a public concern requirement even though 
prisoners’ “complaints are often highly particularized objections to alleged 
individual mistreatment”). 
185 See discussion infra Part III.B–C. 
186 175 F.3d at 388–93. 
187 Id. at 391–92. 
188 Id. at 391; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
189 Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 391. 
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courts]”190 by subjecting it to an additional public concern test.191 
Accordingly, the court refused to determine “the appropriateness of 
explicitly applying the public concern limitation to prisoners, whose 
free speech rights are uncontrovertedly limited by virtue of their 
incarceration.”192 The court’s analysis, however, provided a number of 
salient points for the free speech analysis.  
First, the Thaddeus-X defendants disputed the prisoners’ free 
speech claim by arguing that the prisoners’ speech must involve a 
matter of public concern to receive First Amendment protection 
against retaliation so that prisoners do not possess potentially greater 
free speech rights than public employees.193 The court unequivocally 
agreed by observing that “[p]risoners certainly do not have greater free 
speech rights than public employees.”194 Second, the court found it 
helpful to draw upon the public employee free speech jurisprudence 
when analyzing other free speech retaliation claims because the bulk 
of First Amendment retaliation claims arose in the public employee 
setting.195 Third, the court reasoned that the public concern test should 
not limit prisoners’ most valued right to access the courts because the 
test initially developed to broaden public employees’ free speech 
                                                 
190 Id. at 391 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring)). 
191 Id. at 392. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that applying the public concern test 
to prisoners’ right to access the courts would eliminate virtually all prisoner suits 
because such suits were nearly always a matter of personal concern to the prisoner. 
Id. Alternatively, the Sixth Circuit recognized that it could hold that all prisoner suits 
were per se matters of public concern because of the policies embodied in the 
enabling statutes governing prisoners’ right to access the courts like the habeus 
corpus and § 1983 statutes. Id. at 392 n.8. Yet, the Sixth Circuit realized that such a 
holding had the same effect as not adopting a public concern test because the 
prisoners’ right to access the courts would not be limited by the content of their suits. 
Id.  
192 Id. at 392. 
193 Id. at 388. 
194 Id. The court similarly asserted that “[a] prisoner’s First Amendment rights 
are not more extensive than those of a government employee; in fact, under most 
clauses of the First Amendment, they are much more strictly limited.” Id. at 392.  
195 Id. at 388. 
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rights.196 Fourth, the court observed that the First Amendment 
protected speech based on the context of the speech, and the differing 
First Amendment analyses accounted for the various levels of 
protection.197 For instance, the free speech rights of an individual 
varied depending on whether the individual spoke in a classic public 
forum,198 as a public employee in the public office,199 or as a prisoner 
in a prison cell.200 Lastly, the court commented that “[t]he Pickering 
balancing test . . . has been applied in a variety of First Amendment 
settings,”201 and “can . . . easily be applied in the prison context, 
accommodating the difference between the government as employer 
and as jailor.”202 Yet, the court cautioned that the distinctions between 
the public employees’ free speech rights and the prisoners’ valued 
right to access the courts, the separate interests of the government 
entities, and the dissimilar nature of the relationship between the 
plaintiff and the government in the two settings meant that “any honest 
attempt to perform the [Pickering] balancing . . . cannot unhesitatingly 
import reasoning from the public employment setting into the prison 
setting.”203 
 
                                                 
196 See id. at 389, 393.  
197 Id. at 388–89. 
198 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984) (noting that speakers in a classic public forum can say virtually anything 
without government interference because government speech restrictions in class 
public forums remained subject to strict scrutiny review; i.e., they must be content-
neutral, leave open alternative channels of communication, and “narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest.”).  
199 See discussion supra Part II. 
200 See discussion supra Part I. 
201 Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 392; see also Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 
518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996) (applying the Pickering balancing test to evaluate an 
independent contractor’s free speech retaliation claim). 
202 Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 392.  
203 Id. at 393. When the Seventh Circuit cited this language in Bridges v. 
Gilbert to claim the Sixth Circuit doubted the propriety of applying a public concern 
requirement to prisoners’ free speech, it failed to mention that this language 
specifically referred to the right to access the courts. See 557 F.3d at 551–52.  
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B. The Fifth Circuit’s Approach to Prisoner Free Speech 
Retaliation Claims 
 Two Fifth Circuit cases, Jackson v. Cain204 and Freeman v. 
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,205 illustrated how the Fifth 
Circuit used the Pell test to evaluate prisoners’ free speech claims 
even when the court claimed to apply the Turner test.206 As a resul
the Fifth Circuit further confused the status of prisoners’ free speech 










assertion or simply refused to defer to the prison officials’ assertion.212 
                                                
ials.207  
In Jackson, prison officials allegedly retaliated against a prisoner 
for writing a letter to the warden that complained about how the prison
failed to include some of the clothing he intended to transfer from hi
old prison.208 The court cited Pell to acknowledge that the prisoner 
possessed a “First Amendment right to freedom of expression so 
as it is not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner and does not 
adversely affect a legitimate state interest.”209 Then, the court cla
to extend the Turner test to the prisoner’s free speech retaliation 
claim.210 Yet, the court protected the prisoner’s expression by simply 
holding—without reference to the Turner factors, standard of revie
or any further explanation—that “complaining about treatment by 
means of a private letter to the warden can be compatible with the 
acceptable behavior of a prisoner and thus may not adversely affect 
the discipline of the prison.”211 If the prison officials offered a 
contrary assertion indicating that the prisoner’s letter was actuall
inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives, the court eit
failed to consider the level of appropriate deference to apply to such an 
 
204 864 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1989). 
205 369 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2004).  
206 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
207 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
208 Jackson, 864 F.2d at 1238–39. 
209 Id. at 1248 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 See id. 
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Jackson thus showed that the court applied the Pell test to protect a 
prisoner’s relatively low-value speech about missing laundry.213  
In Freeman, a prisoner alleged retaliation for circulating a 
statement to his fellow inmates and non-incarcerated Church of Christ 
leaders that criticized the chaplain, a prison official, for “depart[ing] 
from the faith” and further requested that the chaplain no longer lead 
the prisoner members of the Church of Christ.214 The prisoner also 
sought and received permission from the chaplain to read the 
statement during a church service.215 The chaplain ordered the 
prisoner to stop reading the statement, and the prisoner quickly 
complied.216 Prison officials then escorted the prisoner from the






                                                
217 The prisoner later received a disciplinary violation fo
causing a disturbance, which he argued retaliated against his freedom
of speech.218
In deciding this case, the Fifth Circuit again applied just the Pell 
test to recognize that prisoners retained a general First Amendment 
right to criticize prison officials, prison conditions, and official 
misconduct.219 The court, however, restricted prisoners’ general right 
to complain about prison conditions and official misconduct by 
requiring prisoners to exercise this right in a manner consistent with 
their status as a prisoner.220 Consequently, the court held that “[p]rison 
officials may legitimately punish inmates who verbally confront 
 
213 See id.; discussion supra Part I.C. 





218 Id. The prisoner also made a free exercise and equal protection claim based 
on the prison’s rules allegedly restricting the worship of Church of Christ members. 
See id. at 860–63. These claims are not relevant to this comment. 
219 Id. at 864 (citing Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995); 
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institutional authority without running afoul of the First 
Amendment.”221 
In applying the Pell test, the Freeman court ruled against the 
prisoner’s free speech claim because the manner of his public criticism 
was not consistent with his status as a prisoner.222 According to the 
court, the prisoner’s speech was inconsistent with his status because 
the prisoner intended his speech to incite a disturbance and his speech 
actually incited a disturbance.223 Remarkably, this reasoning was 
identical to the very protective standard the Court established for 
evaluating government restrictions on speech advocating illegal action 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio.224 Additionally, the Freeman Court did not 
mention if it determined that the prisoner’s speech was inconsistent 
with his status by explicitly deferring to the judgment of the prison 
officials or through its own independent evaluation of the speech.225 
Lastly, the court appeared to support the idea that prisoners retained no 
free speech rights whatsoever because the Freeman prisoner could 
have exercised his Petition Clause rights to make his criticism through 
the prison’s internal grievance procedures, which would have further 
prevented a disturbance or otherwise threaten internal prison 
security.226 
                                                 
221 Id. (citing Goff v. Dailey, 991 F.2d 1437, 1439 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing 
that a “prison has a legitimate penological interest in punishing inmates for mocking 
and challenging correctional officers by making crude personal statements about 
them in a recreation room full of other inmates”)).  
222 Id. 
223 Id.  
224 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional 
guarantees of free speech . . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of 
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”). Yet, in the prison setting, Court precedent established that prison officials 
should have much greater leeway in restricting prisoners’ speech. See discussion 
supra Part I. 
225 See Freeman, 369 F.3d at 864. 
226 Id.; see also Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 367–68 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(limiting prisoners’ right to collaborate in a prison-wide petition because available 
internal grievances procedures better avoided the potential for inciting violence from 
internally circulated petitions).  
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Thus, Freeman demonstrated how the Fifth Circuit applied the 
Pell test to prisoner’s free speech retaliation claims with unpredictable 
results, ranging from no protection whatsoever to applying inflexible 
and highly speech-protective legal rules to govern proper prison 
administration.  
 
C. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach to Prisoner Free Speech 
Retaliation Claims 
  
In Cornell v. Woods,227 the Eighth Circuit applied just the Pell 
test to hold that the First Amendment protected a prisoner’s right to 
freely and truthfully respond to a prison official’s investigation of 
another official’s misconduct without fear of retaliation.228 In Corn
the head of the prison’s internal affairs division promised the prison
claimant immunity from discipline if the prisoner cooperated in the 
investigation of another prison official’s suspected violation of prison 




                                                
229 The prisoner truthfully admitted that he made such a 
transaction with the prison official, but later complained that he 
suffered retaliation for participating in the investigation.230  
In deciding the case, the court first considered whether the 
prisoner possessed a constitutional right to participate in the internal 
prison investigation.231 Initially, the court noted that ordinary citizens 
enjoyed a constitutional privilege to freely participate in governmental 
investigations.232 The court also analogized to the limited First 
Amendment rights of public employees by commenting that even 
public employees remained “constitutionally shielded from employer 
retaliation for their participation in investigations concerning matters 
of public concern.”233 Then, the court applied the Pell test to find that:  
 
227 69 F.3d 1383 (8th Cir. 1995). 
228 Id. at 1388. 
229 Id. at 1386. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 1388. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. (citing Gorman v. Robinson, 977 F.2d 350, 356 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
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[T]he right to respond to a prison investigator’s inquiries 
[was] not inconsistent with a person’s status as a prisoner or 
with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections 
system. To the contrary, . . . truthfully answering questions 
concerning a misconduct investigation against a correctional 
officer [was] undoubtedly quite consistent with legitimate 
penological objectives.234  
 
The court, however, neglected to expressly consider the appropriate 
level of deference or standard of review for any contrary claim made 
by the prison officials that the prisoner’s speech was inconsistent with 
legitimate penological objectives.235 Thus, the court may have simply 
made its own judgment that the prisoner’s speech was “undoubtedly 
quite consistent with legitimate penological objectives.”236 Ultimately, 
the court’s rule may also unduly prevent prison officials from 
legitimately punishing prisoners who prison officials discovered 
violated prison rules through misconduct investigations.237  
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ approaches represented the path the 
Seventh Circuit later adopted in Bridges, while the Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis demonstrated that the Seventh Circuit may have correctly 
applied the public concern test to prisoners’ free speech retaliation 
claims in the first place. This comment now reviews the Seventh 
Circuit’s approach to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims.  
 
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO PRISONER FREE SPEECH 
RETALIATION CLAIMS IN BRIDGES V. GILBERT 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach to evaluating prisoners’ free 
speech retaliation claims depicted the unclear status of prisoners’ free 
speech rights.238 First, the Seventh Circuit unhesitatingly applied the 
                                                 
234 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
238 See discussion infra Parts IV–V.  
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public concern test to the prison setting.239 Then, after thoughtful 
consideration, the Seventh Circuit claimed to adopt the Turner test for 
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims.240 Yet, a careful reading of 
the court’s opinion in Bridges v. Gilbert demonstrated that the Seventh 
Circuit, like the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, applied the Pell test to 
evaluate a prisoner’s free speech retaliation claim.241 Accordingly, 
Part IV of this comment reviews the Seventh Circuit’s prior support of
the public concern test for prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims and 
the court’s opinion in Bridges to “bridge” the irregular and 
unchartered waters of the P 242
 
ell test.    
                                                
 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Prior Support for a Public Concern Test 
for Prisoner Free Speech Retaliation Claims 
The Seventh Circuit first signaled its support for applying the 
public concern test to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims in 
Brookins v. Kolb.243 In Brookins, a prison inmate, who was the co-
chair of a prison paralegal committee, complained that prison officials 
retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights to free 
association and speech.244 While acting as the co-chair of the paralegal 
committee, the inmate wrote a letter advocating that the committee 
pay for the polygraph testing of all the concerned parties in another 
prisoner’s upcoming disciplinary proceedings.245 The letter violated 
prison rules requiring that a prison official authorize any committee 
correspondence and disbursement of committee funds.246 The court 
rejected the inmate’s free speech claim, reasoning that the letter did 
not involve a matter of public concern.247 Yet, Brookins failed to 
 
239 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
240 See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
241 See discussion infra Parts IV.D., V.B. 
242 See discussion infra Parts IV.A, IV.D. 
243 990 F.2d 308, 313 (7th Cir. 1992), abrogated in part by Bridges v. Gilbert, 
557 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009). 
244 Id. at 310. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 313. 
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consider why the prisoner’s speech must involve a matter of public 
concern to receive protection against retaliation.248  
In Sasnett v. Litscher,249 Judge Posner summarily dismissed the 
free speech claims of Protestant prisoners disputing prison regulations 
that restricted them from wearing crosses outside their clothing.250 
While Judge Posner’s decision primarily held that the prisoners’ free 
speech claims were merely duplicative of their valid free exercise 
claims,251 Judge Posner also reasoned that the free speech claims 
failed by analogy to the Pickering line of cases because the prisoners 
did not want to wear the crosses to make a public statement or convert 
other inmates.252  
In McElroy v. Lopac,253 a prison inmate complained that prison 
officials retaliated against him for his inquiries into whether he would 
receive “lay-in” pay while he awaited transfer from his prison sewing 
job to another job after the prison closed the sewing factory.254 The 
majority’s opinion rejected the prisoner’s free speech retaliation claim 
because the prisoner’s questions about “lay-in” pay were a matter of 
purely individual economic interest, and not a matter of public 
concern.255 The dissent argued that the prisoner’s inquiry involved a 
matter of public concern to the prison population who lost their sewing 
jobs and to the general public’s concern about compensating 
unemployed prison workers.256 
Finally, in Pearson v. Welborn,257 a prisoner claimed that he 
suffered retaliation for complaining about the lack of yard time, 
shackling of inmates to one another around a small table during group 
therapy, and refusing to become a prison informant on prison gang 
                                                 
248 See id. 
249 197 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1999), abrogated in part by Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 
F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009). 
250 Id. at 292. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 403 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
254 Id. at 856–57. 
255 Id. at 858–59. 
256 Id. at 859 (Fairchild, J., dissenting). 
257 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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members while he was incarcerated in a new, restrictive security 
environment designed to transfer prison inmates who renounced their 
gang membership back into the general prison population.258 The 
prison officials argued that the prisoner possessed no general right to 
complain about prison conditions, and that his complaints only 
involved mere personal grievances.259 The court held that the 
prisoner’s complaints about the lack of yard time and shackling during 
group therapy involved matters of sufficient public concern because 
they urged a change in the prison policy for all the similarly 
incarcerated prisoners and discussed how the prison operated its 
fledgling program to transition prisoners from the restrictive 
conditions at the maximum-security prison to the standard general 
population prison.260  
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit’s application of the public concern 
test to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims ended with the court’s 
decision in Bridges v. Gilbert. Thus, this comment reviews the factual 
allegations of Bridges before discussing the court’s opinion in Bridges. 
 
B. Factual Allegations in Bridges v. Gilbert 
On September 22, 2006, Jimmy Bridges alleged the following 
facts were true according to his pro se § 1983 complaint that various 
prison officials retaliated against him for exercising his First 
Amendment rights to free speech, to access the courts,261 and to 
petition the government for redress of grievances.262  
                                                 
258 Id. at 734–36. 
259 Id. at 740. 
260 Id. at 741–42. 
261 This comment does not discuss Bridges’s First Amendment claim to a right 
to access the courts. The court rejected this claim because Bridges made his affidavit 
in support of Powe’s right to access the courts, but was not critical to vindicate 
Powe’s right. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 544, 553–54 (7th Cir. 2009). 
262 This comment also does not discuss Bridges’s claims concerning the right to 
petition for redress of grievances. The court rejected this claim because (1) Bridges’s 
threat to file a grievance did not constitute a protected grievance, (2) there was 
insufficient retaliation, and (3) Bridges’s current suit encompassed any harm from 
alleged prior infringements on his Petition Clause rights. Id. at 554–55.  
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While Bridges was a prisoner incarcerated at the Wisconsin 
Secure Program Facility, he lived in a prison cell adjacent to the cell of 
inmate Leon Powe.263 On the night of March 14, 2003, Bridges heard 
Powe complain about a terrible smell in his drinking cup and that he 
had been vomiting.264 A nurse brought Powe some Tylenol and 
Tums.265 The next morning, Bridges called through a vent to check on 
Powe again.266 Powe weakly responded that he was in pain and could 
not eat.267 Several prison officials came to Powe’s cell and told him to 
eat, but Powe failed to respond.268 Afterward, Powe told another group 
of prison officials that he was in terrible pain and could not move.269 
The prison officials responded by threatening to beat-up Powe for not 
responding to earlier inquiries.270 Eventually, prison officials removed 
Powe from his prison cell and brought him to the prison’s medical 
center, but Powe died the following morning.271 
Later, Powe’s estate brought a wrongful death action against 
several prison authorities.272 In March 2005, attorneys for Powe’s 
estate interviewed Bridges as a witness to the care Powe received.273 
Bridges supplied Powe’s attorneys with an affidavit and agreed to 
testify as a trial witness.274 The case settled before trial, but Powe’s 
attorneys used Bridges’s affidavit in response to the prison officials’ 
motion for summary judgment.275 
After the case settled, Bridges believed that prison officials 
subjected him to a campaign of harassment in retaliation for his 
                                                 















Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
participation in the Powe lawsuit.276 Prison officials allegedly caused 
delays in Bridges’s mail, repeatedly kicked open his cell door, turned 
his cell light on and off, and loudly slammed his cell door shut when 
he was sleeping.277 Bridges complained about this treatment to a 
prison guard.278 In response, the guard filed a disciplinary charge 
against Bridges that was later upgraded to a major offense indicating 
that Bridges’s conduct created a serious risk of disruption at the 
prison.279 Eventually, Bridges was exonerated of any wrongdoing in 
connection to the disciplinary charge.280 Bridges also complained that 
prison officials further retaliated against him by improperly treating 
the grievances he filed about these incidents.281 
Ultimately, the district court dismissed Bridges’s complaint for 
his failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure because, like Brookins, Bridges’s affidavit 
only involved a matter personal to Powe’s estate and did not advocate 
a change in prison policy or criticize the administration of prison 
policy.282   
 
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion in Bridges v. Gilbert  
On appeal, Bridges urged the Seventh Circuit to abandon its 
support for a public concern test to prisoners’ free speech claims.283 
Instead, Bridges contended that the Seventh Circuit should apply the 
legitimate penological interest tests from the Court’s prisoner free 
speech jurisprudence to evaluate whether Bridges engaged in protected 
speech.284  
In a decision written by Judge Tinder and joined by Chief Judge 
Easterbrook and Judge Wood, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district 
                                                 






282 See case cited supra note 22. 
283 Bridges, 557 F.3d at 547. 
284 Id. at 547, 551. 
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court’s opinion in Bridges’s favor for his free speech retaliation 
claim.285 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit expressly disavowed its 
support for the public concern test in prisoners’ free speech retaliation 
claims.286 The court, however, left open the possibility of applying the 
public concern test for a prisoner-employee’s complaints about 
compensation like in McElroy.287 Since the panel’s decision overruled 
the Seventh Circuit’s support for a public concern test in prisoners’ 
free speech retaliation claims, the panel circulated its decision among 
all the judges of the Seventh Circuit in regular active service to 
determine if a majority of the judges favored a rehearing en banc 
pursuant to the Seventh Circuit’s Rule 40(e), but no judge favored a 
rehearing.288 
Instead of applying the public concern test to prisoners’ free 
speech retaliation claims, the court claimed to adopt the Turner test.289 
The court’s opinion in Bridges advanced three principal reasons to 
support its purported adoption of the Turner test.290 First, the court 
held that the Turner test constituted the proper test for evaluating 
prisoners’ asserted constitutional interests.291 Second, the court 
reasoned that public employees voluntarily chose the restrictions on 
their free speech rights by accepting public employment, while 
imprisonment remained involuntary.292 Third, the court held that 
applying a public concern test to prisoners’ speech would 
unnecessarily restrict prisoners’ rights more than required to preserve 
legitimate penological interests.293 This comment discusses in turn 
Bridges’s analysis of its three principal reasons for adopting the 
Turner test. 
                                                 
285 Id. at 551–52, 555–56. 
286 Id. at 551 n.2.  
287 Id. at 552 n.3; see also McElroy v. Lopac, 403 F.3d 855, 858–59 (7th Cir. 
2005) (per curiam). 
288 Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551 n.2; see also 7TH CIR. R. 40(e). 
289 Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551. 
290 See id. at 550. 
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First and foremost, the court chose to evaluate prisoners’ free 
speech retaliation claims under the Turner test rather than the public 
concern test because the court acknowledged that the two tests 
developed in two different contexts to account for the unique 
institutional differences between public employment and prisons.294 
Specifically, the court recognized that the Court created the public 
concern test “to maintain the delicate balance between a citizen’s right 
to speak (and the public interest in having thoughtful debate) and the 
employer’s need to effectively provide government services,” while 
the Court formed the legitimate penological interests tests “to preserve 
some free speech rights for prisoners in a restrictive and challenging 
environment where prison officials must be focused on crime 
deterrence, prisoner rehabilitation, and internal prison security.”295  
Second, the court rejected applying the public concern test to 
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims because the court placed 
significant emphasis on the notion that public employees voluntarily 
consented to the limitations on their freedoms whereas prisoners 
remained incarcerated against their will.296 The court justified the 
differing levels of constitutional protection between prisoners and 
public employees by reasoning that “obviously, a citizen has the 
choice to enter into public employment, while imprisonment is not 
voluntary.”297 Similarly, when discussing in dicta the applicability of a 
public concern test to the speech of a prisoner-employee, the court 
commented that “[t]he official interest in the efficient provision of 
[government] services, coupled with the benefits to the prisoner from 
taking the job, may justify a public concern limitation on the 
prisoner’s speech made as an employee.”298 
Third, the court held that applying the public concern test to 
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims would eliminate virtually all 
constitutional protection afforded to prisoner speech.299 Instead of 
                                                 
294 See id. 
295 Id. 
296 See id. 
297 Id. (emphasis added). 
298 Id. at 552 n.3 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
299 See id. at 550. 
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expressly arguing that prisoner speech rarely involved a matter of 
public concern (like the Second and Third Circuits), the court 
observed that applying Garcetti’s distinction between speech as a 
public employee and as a citizen would be impossible in the prison 
context.300 Specifically, the court reasoned that because prisoners 
remained “[s]hut-off from the outside world, the prisoner’s speech 
would nearly always be speech made as a prisoner rather than as a 
citizen.”301 Similarly, when discussing in dicta if the public concern 
test should apply to a prisoner-employee’s speech, the court observed 
that “the degree of control exercised by officials over all aspects of a 
prisoner’s life may make any distinction between speech as an inmate 
and speech as a prisoner-employee unworkable.”302 Lastly, the panel 
also noted that a public concern test for prisoners’ free speech 
retaliation claims needlessly imposed an additional barrier that 
“seem[ed] to restrict prisoners’ constitutional rights far more than is 
‘justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.’”303  
Finally, the court purportedly applied the Turner test to protect 
Bridges’s speech in the affidavit.304 Yet, the court protected Bridges’s 
speech by simply holding that “[p]roviding an eyewitness account . . . 
of an incident where prison officials are alleged to have mistreated an 
inmate who was gravely ill (and later died) is not inconsistent with 
legitimate penological interests.”305 The panel supported its holding 
only by analogizing to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Cornell.306 
Thus, the court declared that “[p]risons have an interest in keeping the 
inmates as safe and secure as possible while imprisoned, and truthful 
speech that describes possible abuses can actually be quite consistent 
with that objective.”307 Accordingly, the court concluded that 
“Bridges . . . adequately alleged, for the purposes of surviving a 
                                                 
300 Id.; see also cases cited supra note 184 and accompanying text.  
301 Bridges, 557 F.3d at 550 (internal quotations omitted). 
302 Id. at 552 n.3. 
303 Id. at 550 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). 
304 See id. at 551–52. 
305 Id. at 551. 
306 Id.; see also discussion supra Part III.C. 
307 Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551. 
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motion to dismiss, that he engaged in activity protected by the First 
Amendment.”308 
 
V. EVALUATION OF BRIDGES: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN PELL, 
TURNER, AND THE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF PRISONERS AND 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES. 
Part V first argues that the Seventh Circuit’s disavowal of the 
public concern test in the prison context likely conformed with, but 
was not required by, Supreme Court precedent. Then, Part V contends 
that the court likely erred in actually applying the relatively 
unexamined and indeterminate Pell test to protect Bridges’s allegedly 
truthful speech about prison abuses with unfortunate consequences for 
the clarity of prisoners’ free speech rights and the prerogatives of 
prison officials. Lastly, Part V argues that the court should have 
continued to use a modified version of the public concern and 
Pickering balancing tests for prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims 
because those tests offered clarity and protection to important First 
Amendment speech, provided sufficient deference to prison officials’ 
needs, and ensured that prisoners do not possess potentially greater 
free speech rights than public employees.  
 
A. The Seventh Circuit Likely Conformed to Court Precedent 
by Disavowing the Public Concern Test for Prisoners’ Free 
Speech Retaliation Claims 
 
In rejecting the public concern test and purportedly adopting the 
Turner test to evaluate prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims, the 
Seventh Circuit likely conformed to the Court’s precedent. Although 
the Court’s prisoner and public employee free speech jurisprudences 
do not expressly affirm or reject applying the public concern and 
Pickering balancing tests to prisoners’ free speech retaliation 
claims,309 Bridges correctly reasoned that the Court created the public 
concern and legitimate penological interests tests to account for and 
                                                 
308 Id. at 551–52.  
309 See supra notes 11, 15 and accompanying text. 
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evaluate the level of First Amendment protection in two different 
institutional contexts.310 While the Court’s approach to create a First 
Amendment “doctrine for every institution” may actually exaggerate 
institutional uniqueness to the detriment of protecting fundamental 
free speech rights and promoting uniformity in the law,311 the Sixth 
Circuit rightly observed that “context matters” in the Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.312 Hence, even though the Court applied 
the public concern and Pickering balancing tests to other free speech 
claims,313 because the Court created the public concern and 
penological interest tests to accommodate the First Amendment 
distinctions in two different institutional contexts, inferior courts likely 
remained bound to following the Court’s tests for each context.314  
Furthermore, the Court’s opinion in Shaw v. Murphy provided the 
Seventh Circuit with sufficient precedential support to reject the public 
concern test for prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims.315 First, the 
Shaw Court declared that “Turner . . . adopted a unitary, deferential 
standard for reviewing prisoners’ constitutional claims.”316 Secondly, 
the Shaw Court specifically refused to enhance the constitutional 
protections of a prisoner’s speech based on the content of the 
prisoner’s speech because “the Turner test, by its terms, simply does 
not accommodate valuations of content.”317  
                                                 
310 See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551; discussion supra Part IV.C. 
311 See Moss, supra note 18, at 1671. Moss argued for evaluating the First 
Amendment claims of public school students, public employees, and prisoners under 
intermediate scrutiny review because the Court’s current approaches exaggerated the 
risk of affording greater protection to constitutionally guaranteed rights. Id. at 1644–
45, 1674–79. Moss further asserted that the Court’s strict scrutiny review of racial 
discrimination claims in each of these institutional settings proved the Court not only 
exaggerated the risks in the First Amendment setting, but also caused disharmony in 
the law by granting different levels of constitutional protection to similar 
fundamental rights in the same institutional settings. Id. at 1674–79.    
312 See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999); discussion 
supra Part III.A. 
313 See cases cited supra notes 154–55, 201. 
314 See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551. 
315 See 532 U.S. 223, 228–30 (2001); supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
316 Shaw, 532 U.S. at 229. 
317 Id. at 229; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
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While Shaw incorrectly claimed that Turner adopted a “unitary” 
standard for evaluating prisoners’ constitutional claims,318 the Court 
consistently applied just the Turner test to evaluate prisoners’ asserted 
free speech claims.319 Additionally, if the Seventh Circuit adopted the 
public concern test for prisoners’ free speech claims, then the Seventh 
Circuit would necessarily make a valuation of the content of the 
prisoners’ speech by preferring prisoners’ speech on a matter of public 
concern.320 Shaw rejected such preferential valuations based on the 
content of a prisoner’s speech because they (1) contravened Turner’s 
singular focus between the prison’s legitimate interests and the 
prison’s restrictions on speech and (2) frustrated the Court’s policy of 
deference to prison officials by requiring courts to undertake a greater 
role in adjudicating prison affairs.321 Arguably, if the public concern 
test actually limited the constitutional protection granted to prisoner 
speech, then Shaw may implicitly endorse the test.322 In any event, 
Shaw provided sufficient precedential support for the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision to reject the public concern test in favor of the 
Turner test when evaluating prisoners’ free speech retaliation 
claims.323     
                                                 
318 Turner clearly failed to adopt a “unitary” standard for reviewing prisoners’ 
constitutional claims. The Court extended Turner in Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 
126 (2003) (prisoners’ First Amendment right to freedom of association); Lewis v. 
Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (prisoners’ First Amendment right of access to the 
courts); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (prisoners’ due process right 
against involuntary medication); and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 
(1987) (prisoners’ First Amendment right to free exercise of religion). Yet, the Court 
refused to extend Turner in Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (prisoners’ 
Fourteenth Amendment right against invidious racial discrimination); McKune v. 
Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (prisoners’ Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination); and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (prisoners’ Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment).   
319 See discussion supra Part I. 
320 See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (“Whether . . . speech 
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and 
context of a given statement.”).  
321 Shaw, 532 U.S. at 230. 
322 See id. 
323 See id. 
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B. The Seventh Circuit Incorrectly Applied the Pell Test 
Instead of the Turner Test to Evaluate Bridges’s Free 
Speech Retaliation Claim 
Although the Seventh Circuit likely conformed to Court precedent 
by purportedly adopting the Turner test to evaluate Bridges’s free 
speech retaliation claim, the court probably erred by actually applying 
the Pell test when it considered Bridges’s free speech retaliation claim. 
Consequently, the court’s attempt to navigate the relatively 
unchartered waters of the Pell test left the court making its own 
judgments about proper prison procedure with potentially vast 
consequences for prisoners’ free speech rights and prison officials’ 
pursuit of legitimate penological objectives.  
Like the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit clearly 
applied the Pell test rather than the Turner test when the court 
evaluated Bridges’s free speech claim.324 In claiming to apply the 
Turner test to Bridges’s free speech claim, the Seventh Circuit failed 
to quote the language of the Turner test, apply the Turner factors, 
evaluate the rational basis between the prison officials’ actions and the 
prison’s legitimate interests, explicitly invoke rational basis review, or 
expressly consider the level of deference it afforded to the prison 
officials.325 
Instead, the court merely held that Bridges sufficiently alleged a 
free speech retaliation claim because his eyewitness account of an 
incident where prison officials allegedly mistreated a gravely ill 
inmate was not inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives.326 
Had the Seventh Circuit correctly applied the Turner test, then the 
court would have questioned if the prison’s allegedly retaliatory 
actions possessed a reasonable relationship to the prison’s legitimate 
penological interests.327  
For example, if the Seventh Circuit applied the Turner test, the 
Bridges prison officials could have asserted that they engaged in the 
                                                 
324 See discussion supra Parts III.B–C, IV.C. 
325 See discussion supra Parts I.B, IV.C. 
326 See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009). 
327 See supra note 349. 
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allegedly retaliatory actions because—in their expert judgment—such 
actions reasonably related to the prison’s legitimate interests in having 
Bridges use the prison’s internal grievance system to report official 
abuse or request medical attention.328 As the Fifth Circuit similarly 
recognized in Freeman, such internal grievance systems not only 
preserved prisoners’ First Amendment rights (to petition, not to 
speak), but also decreased the risk of violence from prisoners’ public 
criticisms of officials’ conduct and “kept inmates as safe and secure as 
possible while imprisoned” by swiftly assessing the need to provide 
medical services and punish official abuse.329 If the Seventh Circuit 
applied the Turner test to this contention, then the court likely would 
have concluded that the prison officials possessed a rational basis for 
restricting Bridges’s speech.330  
Furthermore, because the court did not question the 
reasonableness of restricting Bridges’s allegedly truthful speech about 
prison abuses under the Turner test, the court formed a rigid rule 
categorically protecting prisoners’ allegations about prison abuses.331 
By simply applying the Pell test to hold that prisoners’ allegedly 
truthful speech about prison abuses was not inconsistent with 
legitimate penological objectives, the court determined that restricting 
such speech remained unreasonably inconsistent with legitimate 
penological objectives unless the court later drew an exception to its 
rule.332 Yet, restrictions on prisoners’ speech about prison abuses may 
be entirely consistent with legitimate penological objectives. For 
                                                 
328 See discussion supra Parts I.B, IV.B; cf. also Freeman v. Tex. Dep’t of 
Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2004). 
329 See Freeman, 369 F.3d at 864; Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551. This argument 
could also imply that prisoners’ free speech rights remained entirely inconsistent 
with incarceration under the Pell test, especially where prisons operated grievance 
procedures. See Freeman, 369 F.3d at 864.   
330 See id.; discussion supra Part I.B. The prison officials’ actions would be 
logically connected to the prison’s legitimate interest in responding appropriately to 
prisoners’ requests for medical attention or complaints about official abuse instead of 
waiting to dispute such information in an adversarial lawsuit. See Bridges, 557 F.3d 
at 544–45; discussion supra Part I.B.   
331 See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551; discussion supra Part I.C. 
332 See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551. 
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instance, prison officials may want to restrict prisoners’ complaints 
about prison abuses due to the potential danger to incite a riot like in 
Freeman or because of its insulting, demonstrably false, or otherwise 
unproductive character.333 Thus, while it may be reasonable in some 
instances to restrict prisoners’ speech about prison abuses, the court’s 
rule in Bridges unduly threatens prison officials with liability for 
appropriately responding to speech threatening the prison’s legitimate 
interests.  
Finally, the court protected Bridges’s allegedly truthful speech 
describing prison abuses by making its own judgment that such speech 
remained consistent with the prison’s interest in keeping “inmates as 
safe and secure as possible while imprisoned.”334 Consequently, the 
court not only contravened Court precedent explicitly instructing 
courts to not make judgments about proper prison administration, but 
the Seventh Circuit’s judgments may unduly impede proper prison 
administration.335   
For instance, the court’s decision in Bridges failed to mention the 
level of deference it applied to any of the prison officials’ contrary 
contentions that Bridges’s speech was inconsistent with 
incarceration.336 Instead, the court reasoned from the Eighth Circuit’s 
determination in Cornell that truthful speech about prison official 
abuses was consistent with imprisonment.337 Even if the Eighth 
Circuit made its own judgment about proper prison administration in 
Cornell, the court merely enforced the prison officials’ promise of 
immunity to the prisoner for participating in the prison’s own 
investigation; i.e., the Eighth Circuit only extended protection to 
prison-solicited prisoner speech.338 Conversely, the Seventh Circ
rule may allow the inmates to run the asylum by protecting unsolicited




                                                 
333 See Freeman, 369 F.3d at 864; discussion supra Part I.A–B.   
334 See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551. 
335 See discussion supra Part I.A–C; discussion infra Part V.B. 
336 See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551. 
337 Id. (citing Cornell v. Woods, 69 F.3d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
338 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
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prison officials’ legitimate penological interests.339 Essentially, the 





                                                
340 While prison officials may act wisel
not retaliating against prisoners’ allegedly truthful speech about pris
abuses, the Court’s precedent left this judgment to prison officials, and 
not the dictates of the First Amendment.341  
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit’s application of the Pell test to 
Bridges’s free speech retaliation claim arguably supplanted the prison 
officials’ judgment of proper prison administration and created a 
categorical rule that may unduly interfere with prison officials’ 
provision of legitimate penological objectives. Lastly, while the 
Seventh Circuit applied the Pell test to protect Bridges’s speech, future 
applications of the Pell test may leave prisoners’ speech completely 
unprotected. 
 
C. The Seventh Circuit Should Have Adapted the Public 
Concern and Pickering Balancing Tests to Evaluate 
Bridges’s Free Speech Retaliation Claim 
Instead of applying the legitimate penological interest tests to 
prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims, the Seventh Circuit should 
have considered balancing Bridges’s speech as a prisoner on a matter 
of public concern against the prison’s legitimate penological interests 
in restricting Bridges’s speech. Such an approach proves more 
workable than the legitimate penological interest tests, protects critical 
free speech rights, and ensures that prisoners do not possess 
potentially broader free speech rights than public employees. 
 
 
339 See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551. 
340 See id. 
341 See cf. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (“While as a matter of 
good judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered 
by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run 
as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”); see 
discussion supra Part I. 
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1. The Public Concern and Pickering Balancing Tests Evaluate 
Prisoners’ Free Speech Retaliation Claims Better than the 
Legitimate Penological Interests Tests  
As the Sixth Circuit recognized, the public concern and Pickering 
balancing tests are easily adaptable to the prison context provided 
courts perform an honest attempt to not unhesitatingly import 
reasoning from the public employee setting to the prison context.342 
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that applying the public concern test to 
the prison context resulted in an unworkable rule because (1) prisoners 
rarely spoke as citizens on matters of public concern and (2) prisoners’ 
complaints generally involved matters of purely private concern.343 
However, the Seventh Circuit’s prior applications of the public 
concern test to prisoners’ free speech claims should resolve both of 
these concerns.344  
In addressing this first concern, the Seventh Circuit largely 
ignored the requirement that prisoners must speak as a citizen.345 Such 
an approach may be appropriate because prisoners generally and 
necessarily lack the freedom public employees possess to exercise 
their dual rights as citizens.346 Yet, prisoners often speak as citizens, 
especially when they engage in any outgoing communications; i.e., 
communications intended for use outside the prison walls like writing 
letters, articles, books, etc.347 For instance, Bridges probably spoke as 
                                                 
342 Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 392 (6th Cir. 1999); see also 
discussion supra Part III.A . 
343 Bridges, 557 F.3d at 550; see also cases cited supra note 184 and 
accompanying text. 
344 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
345 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
346 See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 550, 552 n.3. Compare discussion supra Part I, 
with discussion supra Part II. 
347 Cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006) (holding that the 
public employee did not speak as a citizen when he wrote the memorandum pursuant 
to his official duties); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411–12 (1989) (holding 
that prisoners’ incoming communications posed a greater threat to internal prison 
security than outgoing communications because outgoing communications were not 
intended for an inmate audience and officials could readily identify the predictable 
dangers from outside communications).   
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a citizen when he gave his affidavit in a legal proceeding.348 While 
Bridges owed the existence of his speech describing possible prison 
abuses to his status as a prisoner, Bridges did not make his speech 
pursuant to any duties he possessed as a prisoner.349 In any event, 
simply evaluating the prisoner’s speech as a prisoner resolves this 
concern. If the government-as-jailor possesses special interests in 
restricting a prisoner’s speech as a prisoner compared to a prisoner’s 
speech as a citizen, then the Pickering balancing test can properly 
account for those interests by giving stronger weight to the 
government’s interests.350  
In addressing the second concern, the Seventh Circuit’s prior 
applications of the public concern test prove that the test is readily 
applicable to the prison setting.351 The Seventh Circuit’s precedent 
showed that prisoners’ speech involved a matter of public concern if 
the speech urged a change in prison policy, criticized the official 
administration of prison policy, informed the general public about how 
the government operated important prison institutions, or involved a 
matter of concern to the prison population.352 This not only protects a 
significant quantum of prisoner speech, but it offers protection to 
roughly the same type of speech that courts categorically protected 
                                                 
348 Compare Bridges, 557 F.3d at 544–45 (prisoner providing an affidavit in a 
public lawsuit), with Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22 (employee writing a 
memorandum pursuant to his official duties).   
349 See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
350 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 
569–70 (1968); Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (stating that “the 
State’s burden in justifying [its interests] varie[d] depending upon the nature of the 
employee's expression.”). 
351 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
352 Brookins v. Kolb, 990 F.2d 308, 313 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoners’ 
speech urging a change of prison policy or criticizing official administration of 
prison policy involved a matter of public concern); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 
732, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that prisoner’s speech informing the general 
public about the internal operations of a new prison program to integrate gang 
members into the general prison population involved a matter of public concern); see 
also McElroy v. Lopac, 403 F.3d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (Fairchild, J., dissenting) 
(claiming that prisoner’s speech about “lay-in” pay after prison terminated prisoners’ 
sewing jobs involved a matter of public concern to the respective prison population).  
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under their applications of the Pell test.353 Moreover, prisoners can 
pursue purely private concerns through the prison’s internal grievance 
procedures or by otherwise exercising their Petition Clause rights.354 
As the Sixth Circuit warranted, this distinction between prisoners’ free 
speech and petition rights may be justified because prisoners possess a 
well-established and well-regulated right to petition unlike their 
ambiguous and more restricted free speech rights.355 Also, because 
prisoners’ individual free speech rights can be justified largely due to 
the public’s interest in “free and unhindered debate on matters of 
public importance,” unlike prisoners’ highly individualized right to 
petition, a public concern test may be uniquely appropriate and 
workable for prisoners’ free speech claims.356  
More importantly, the Seventh Circuit should have recognized 
that both of the legitimate penological interest tests form unworkable 
rules in evaluating prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims. The Pell 
test either (1) forces courts to make their own improper judgments 
about appropriate prison administration with the consequence of 
dictating inflexible categorical rules to prison officials, (2) allows 
courts to defer absolutely to prison officials, or (3) permits courts to 
simply determine that prisoners retained no free speech rights 
whatsoever.357 As for the Turner test, it compels courts to defer too 
much to prison officials, with the consequence of recognizing 
practically no prisoner free speech rights and remaining especially 
unworkable in evaluating free speech retaliation claims.358  
Since the Turner test protects prisoners’ free speech retaliation 
claims only if the prison officials’ allegedly retaliatory actions possess 
no reasonable relation to the prison’s legitimate penological concerns, 
the test conflated the third element in prisoners’ free speech retaliation 
                                                 
353 See discussion supra Parts III.B–C, IV.C. 
354 See, e.g., Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000). 
355 See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391–92 (6th Cir. 1999). 
356 See id.; cf. also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 
U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968) (protecting public employees’ limited free speech right to 
speak on a matter of public concern because the First Amendment specially 
protected the public’s interest in free and unhindered debate).  
357 See discussion supra Parts I.C., V.B. 
358 See discussion supra Parts I.B–C, V.B.; discussion infra Part V.C.1. 
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claims with the first element.359 In the first element to a prisoner’s free 
speech retaliation claim, the prisoner must prove that they engaged in 
activity protected by the First Amendment; and in the third element, 
the prisoner must prove that the First Amendment activity was at least 
a motivating factor in the prison officials’ decision to take the 
retaliatory action.360 The Turner test conflates these two elements 
because courts would likely determine if the prison officials’ allegedly 
retaliatory actions possess a reasonable relation to the legitimate 
penological objective by inquiring into the prison officials’ motivation 
for suppressing the prisoners’ speech.361 Hence, if a prisoner’s 
freedom of speech forms a motivating factor in the prison official’s 
retaliatory actions, then the prison official’s actions probably possess 
no reasonable relationship to legitimate penological objectives unless 
the prisoner’s freedom of speech remains fundamentally inconsistent 
with legitimate penological objectives.362 Since the Pell test ultimately 
questions whether a prisoner’s free speech rights remains 
fundamentally inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives, 
courts understandably found themselves applying the undefined and 
indeterminate Pell test to evaluate prisoners’ free speech retaliation 
claims.363  
Unlike the legitimate penological interest tests, the Court 
established the public concern and Pickering balancing tests to 
specifically evaluate the level of constitutional protection in free 
speech retaliation claims.364 Thus, as the Sixth Circuit implicitly 
recognized, a test that adapts the Court’s sole test for evaluating free 
speech retaliation claims to the prison context may better account for 
the institutional uniqueness of prisons than blindly applying the 
current legitimate penological interest tests to prisoners’ free speech 
retaliation claims.365  
                                                 
359 See discussion supra Parts I.B–C.  
360 See, e.g., Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009). 
361 See discussion supra Parts I.B–C, V.C.1. 
362 See discussion supra Parts I.B–C, V.C.1. 
363 See discussion supra Parts I.B–C, III.B–C, IV.C. 
364 See discussion supra Parts I–II. 
365 See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 389 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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Furthermore, the Pickering balancing test may prove more 
practical for evaluating prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims than 
the legitimate penological interest tests for three primary reasons. 
First, courts can easily adapt the Pickering factors to deal with prisons’ 
unique interests in performing legitimate penological objectives, and 
lots of the current Pickering factors similarly apply to the prison 
context.366 For instance, Connick affords “a wide degree of deference 
to the employer’s judgment” when the employee’s speech concerns 
itself more with causing insubordination or violates office policy; and, 
this wide degree of deference even allows employers to take action 
before a disruption unfolded. 367 Likewise, prison officials should 
probably receive “a wide degree of deference” when a prisoners’ 
speech is more concerned with causing insubordination, and especially 
if it violates prison policy.368 Yet, when the Fifth Circuit in Freeman 
attempted to afford this wide degree of deference to a prisoners’ 
“insubordinate” speech, the court likely frustrated prison officials’ 
future efforts by protecting insubordinate speech that did not intend to 
or actually incite a disturbance.369  
Second, while the Shaw Court criticized content-balancing tests 
for supplanting the due deference courts owe to prison officials,370 
cases like Connick demonstrate that the Pickering balance sufficiently 
affords substantial deference to the government’s interests.371 Connick 
specifically created the categorical balancing in the public concern test 
so that courts would completely defer to the employer’s interests when 
the employee fails to speak on a matter of public concern.372 Thus, a 
rule requiring prisoners to speak on a matter of public-penological 
concern before evaluating the legitimate penological interests involved 
may prove more deferential than a rule solely examining the asserted 
                                                 
366 See id. at 392; discussion supra Parts II.A–B.  
367 Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 151–52 (1983). 
368 See id.; discussion supra Part I. 
369 See Freeman v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 
2004); supra note 224 and accompanying text.  
370 Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229–30 (2001). 
371 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
372 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–47. 
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penological interests.373 Moreover, courts sufficiently possess the 
requisite expertise to appropriately balance the prison’s legitimate 
interests against the prisoners’ free speech rights.374 Not only is it the 
role of courts to balance competing interests in adjudicating 
constitutional claims, but courts routinely “adjudicate case fields alien 
to them” without deferring to certain interests or claims like they 
would in the Pickering balancing test.375 
Third, the legitimate penological interest tests may not provide 
adequate deference to the government’s interests. Courts routinely 
apply the indeterminate Pell test to afford little or no deference to 
prison officials’ judgments, and they further create inflexible 
categorical rules dictating proper prison administration.376 
Alternatively, because the Pickering balancing test depends on the 
unique facts of the case, courts’ applications of the Pickering 
balancing test would not inappropriately form inflexible categorical 
rules dictating proper prison administration.377   
Hence, applying the public concern and Pickering balancing tests 
to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims forms a practical rule that 
would prove more feasible than applying the legitimate penological 
interest tests to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims.    
 
                                                 
373 See id.; discussion supra Part V.B. 
374 See Moss, supra note 18, at 1666–68. Moss noted that “judges do have a fair 
bit of expertise in the criminal justice system, given both their extensive adjudication 
of prisoner filings and the background a great many federal judges have as 
prosecutors or otherwise as government officials in the executive or legislative 
branch.” Id. at 1667. Moss further argued that “even if certain institutions are harder 
for courts to analyze effectively, parties and courts are unlikely to accept erroneous 
rulings easily, but instead will spend more time and resources remedying the 
problem of imperfect information.” Id. at 1667–68.  
375 See id. at 1666–67; discussion supra Part II. 
376 See discussion supra Parts I.C, III.B–C, V.B.  
377 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 
563, 569 (1968) (“Because of the enormous variety of fact situations . . . we do not 
deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard 
against which all such statements may be judged.”). 
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2. The Public Concern and Pickering Balancing Tests Protect 
Prisoners’ Most Important First Amendment Rights While 
Ensuring that Prisoners Do Not Possess Potentially Broader 
Free Speech Rights than Public Employees 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Bridges recognized that adopting 
the legitimate penological interests tests not only protects speech on a 
lower “rung [in] the hierarchy of First Amendment values,” but also 
potentially affords prisoners with broader free speech rights than 
public employees.378 Conversely, applying the public concern and 
Pickering balancing tests to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims 
would protect prisoners’ important free speech rights, provide 
definition to the Court’s amorphous prisoner free speech 
jurisprudence, and ensure that prisoners do not absurdly possess 
potentially greater free speech rights than public employees. 
As demonstrated by the Court’s public employee free speech 
jurisprudence, “the First Amendment’s primary aim is the full 
protection of speech upon issues of public concern.”379 The Court 
specifically created and defined the free speech rights of public 
employees to protect speech on a matter of public concern because of 
(1) “the Constitution’s special concern with threats to the right of 
citizens to participate in political affairs,”380 and (2) “[t]he public’s 
interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public 
importance [remained] the core value of the Free Speech Clause.”381 
Lastly, “the [C]ourt has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public 
issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values,’ and is entitled to special protection.”382 
Thus, if the First Amendment’s primary aim remained the full 
protection of speech on matters of public concern, then the legitimate 
                                                 
378 See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Carey v. 
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). 
379 Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (emphasis added). 
380 Id. at 144–45 (emphasis added).  
381 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added).  
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penological interest tests’ failure to specially protect speech on matters 
of public concern serves no real or important First Amendment 
interests.383 In fact, since the legitimate penological interests tests 
“refused to recognize any hierarchy of values among important [free 
speech] interests” by elevating any penological concern to “a higher 
constitutional plane than [the prisoner’s free speech] rights,” they 
protect practically worthless speech while failing to protect cherished 
First Amendment values.384 Tellingly, the legitimate penological 
interest tests protects low-value speech about a prisoner’s missing 
laundry in Jackson, but it may not protect the Pearson prisoner’s 
critically important speech about prison officials coercing prisoners 
into becoming prison informants.385  
Obviously, the Court developed the legitimate penological interest 
tests because it wanted to accommodate the needs of prison officials, 
and not because it wanted to protect valuable speech.386 Thus, if the 
public concern and Pickering balancing tests sufficiently 
accommodate prison officials’ needs, then the tests should be preferred 
because they also protect critically important speech at the heart of the 
First Amendment’s self-government rationale.  
Additionally, the fact that prisoners necessarily sacrifice some of 
the rights and privileges that they normally possess as citizens does 
not mean that the First Amendment should potentially afford no 
protection to prisoners’ speech on matters of public concern.387 Like 
public employees, prisoners retain some rights as citizens to engage in 
public debate; so, the First Amendment should specially protect their 
speech on matters of public concern.388 More importantly, the First 
Amendment should especially protect prisoners’ speech on matters of 
public concern because such speech critically informs “the public’s 
                                                 
383 See id. 
384 See discussion supra Part I.C; supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
385 See Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1428 (5th Cir. 1989); Pearson v. 
Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2006). 
386 See discussion supra Part I. 
387 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; discussion supra Parts II, V.C.2.  
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interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public 
importance;” e.g., the operation of prison institutions.389 Like public 
employees, prisoners are “as a class, the members of a community 
most likely to possess informed and definite opinions,” and share 
critical facts and information about the operation of prison 
institution.390 Since prisons are typically isolated from the general 
public, and because government’s power in operating prisons is at its 
apex, the First Amendment should afford special protection to 
prisoners’ speech on matters involving prison operations to inform the 
public debate and serve as a check on governmental abuse of 
power.391 At the least, this proposition seems more sensible and in 
accord with the First Amendment’s purposes than a test treating 
prisoners as partners in proper prison adminis 392tration.    
                                                
Furthermore, the public concern and Pickering balancing tests 
provide critical definition and protection to prisoners’ amorphous free 
speech rights. The legitimate penological interests tests fail to identify 
and assess any value to prisoners’ free speech rights as against the 
government’s interests.393 Consequently, courts possess little guidance 
in identifying what free speech rights to protect—if any—and when to 
actually protect those rights against legitimate governmental 
restrictions.394 Alternatively, the public concern and Pickering 
balancing tests expressly inform courts to protect a prisoner’s speech 
on a matter of public concern unless the government possesses greater 
legitimate penological interests in restricting the prisoner’s speech.395 
Whether courts will actually protect prisoners’ speech on matters of 
public-penological concern depends on the strength of the prison’s 
legitimate penological objectives, to which courts give great deference 
 
389 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 
573 (1968); MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 5.00. 
390 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.  
391 See MUSLIN, supra note 3, § 5.00; discussion supra Part I.  
392 See discussion supra Parts V.B, V.C.2. 
393 See discussion supra Part I.C; supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
394 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
395 See discussion supra Part II. 
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under the Court’s prisoner free speech jurisprudence and similar 
Pickering balancing factors.396 
Lastly, applying the public concern and Pickering balancing tests 
to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims ensures that prisoners do 
not posses potentially greater free speech rights than public 
employees. While the Seventh Circuit accurately noted that “[a] 
prisoner’s speech can be circumscribed in many ways that a public 
employee’s speech cannot, and the two tests for assessing protected 
speech account for those differences,” the legitimate penological 
interests test may afford prisoners greater free speech rights than 
public employees by not specifically subjecting prisoners’ speech to a 
public concern requirement.397 Thus, the court’s holding in Bridges 
presents an absurd result. As the Sixth Circuit said, “[p]risoners 
certainly do not have greater free speech rights than public 
employees.”398  
The Seventh Circuit, however, justified this potentially absurd 
result on the thoroughly discredited rationale that public employees 
waived restrictions on their free speech rights by consenting to their 
government employment.399 The Court unequivocally rejected the 
view that public employees waived their constitutional rights as a 
condition of their employment.400 If anything, “[t]he waiver argument 
seems strongest as to prisoners.”401 Arguably, prisoners waive their 
rights by virtue of committing a crime or as a necessary incident of 
their incarceration or punishment.402  
Concededly, a balancing test that ignores the requirement that 
prisoners speak as citizens and further permits prisoners to speak on 
matters of penological concern may give prisoners greater free speech 
rights than public employees. It just seems absurd, however, that the 
                                                 
396 See discussion supra Parts I, II, V.C.1. 
397 Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 550 (7th Cir. 2009); see also supra note 17 
and accompanying text.  
398 See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999); see also 
supra note 194 and accompanying text.  
399 See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
400 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
401 Moss, supra note 17, at 1652. 
402 Id. at 1652–53. 
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First Amendment would not specially protect speech on a public 
concern; and in so doing, potentially grant prisoners more freedom of 




Ultimately, applying the public concern and Pickering balancing 
tests to prisoners’ free speech retaliation claims would provide 
definition and security to prisoners’ free speech rights, promote 
important speech at the heart of the First Amendment, afford sufficient 
deference to prison officials’ needs, and ensure that prisoners do not 
possess potentially greater free speech rights than public employees. 
The public concern and Pickering balancing tests offer a bridge to a 
new First Amendment future in prisoners’ free speech retaliation 
claims. That bridge provides definition and protection to the uncertain, 
amorphous, and largely unprotected status of prisoners’ free speech 
rights. That bridge also does not unduly interfere with prison officials’ 
pursuit of legitimate penological objectives or potentially protect vast 
amounts of relatively worthless speech. That is the bridge the Seventh 
Circuit should have built for evaluating prisoners’ free speech 
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